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Under the “One Country, Two Systems” rule, Hong Kong and China maintain different legal 
systems. This dichotomy applies also in antitrust: China adopted its Anti-Monopoly Law in 
2007, while Hong Kong waited until 2012 to introduce its Competition Ordinance (and another 
three years to fully implement it). This article compares the antitrust laws of these two 
jurisdictions, and their enforcement, in the light of a turning point: the disruption caused by 
so-called Big Tech. Interestingly, while the competition laws of Hong Kong and China are 
substantively similar to each other and to legal precedent in other jurisdictions, Hong Kong 
has adopted an adversarial system of enforcement, and China an administrative system. 
Through an analysis of recent antitrust developments in the two jurisdictions, this article shows 
the importance of agency independence, due process, and robust judicial scrutiny for the 
proper functioning of an administrative system of enforcement; and at the same that judicial 
scrutiny in an adversarial system needs the certainty of legal rules, in particular to clarify the 
burden of proof to be met by the competition authorities. In the light of these findings, this 
article proposes that the two principles of due process and robust but workable judicial 
scrutiny should remain at the heart of antitrust. This is important at a time when, globally, the 
frustration with market concentration in certain sectors, and especially with Big Tech, may 
lead policymakers to propose changes to antitrust enforcement that could weaken these two 
principles, and to attribute higher value to the speed of decision-making, over the importance 










It has been remarked that digital platforms disrupt “not just incumbent industries, but also 
academic imaginations about the future course of capitalism.”1 And, one could add, not just 
academic imaginations, but also the way that policymakers conceive of antitrust, and 
competition authorities view their mandate. The changes in the US, from the introduction of 
new antitrust legislation,2 to the new administration’s efforts to remodel the role of the FTC,3 
are perhaps the most visible, alongside the efforts of the EU to adopt effective regulation of 
Big Tech.4 Although these measures signal a shift in the enforcement priorities of established 
antitrust authorities (US), and towards ex ante regulation (EU), the basic tenets of competition 
law are not challenged per se.  
 
In other countries, politicians and antitrust authorities sometimes make the case for expanding 
the powers of the competition authorities and reduce procedural protections, often in the 
context of an assessment of the market power of Big Tech. For example, on 20 April 2021, the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the German Bundeskartellamt 
and the UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) issued a joint statement on merger 
control enforcement,5 highlighting the challenges posed by merger review particularly in  
“dynamic and fast-paced markets” where “the last decade has seen the rise of acquisitive tech 
giants” leading to, in some cases, highly concentrated markets.6 The authorities stress that all 
 
1 Gernot Grabher and Jonas König, Disruption, Embedded. A Polanyan Framing of the Platform Economy 
SOCIOLOGICA 95, 95 (2020). 
2 Cecilia Kang, Lawmakers, Taking Aim at Big Tech, Push Sweeping Overhaul of Antitrust, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES (June 11, 2021, updated June 29, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/11/technology/big-tech-
antitrust-bills.html (archived Aug. 26, 2021). 
3 Kiran Stacey, Washington vs Big Tech: Lina Khan’s battle to transform US antitrust, FINANCIAL TIMES 
(Aug. 10, 2021) https://www.ft.com/content/eba8d3d7-dba7-4389-858c-5406c31b413d (archived Aug. 26, 
2021). 
4 Javier Espinoza, Brussels faces test of its will to tackle Big Tech, FINANCIAL TIMES (Aug. 4, 2021). 
5 ACCC, Bundeskartellamt, CMA, Joint statement on merger control enforcement (Apr. 20, 2021) 
https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/joint-statement-on-merger-control-enforcement (archived Aug. 26, 2021). 
6 Id. at ¶ 10. 
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mergers are assessed in a forward looking manner and “uncertainty as to the future should not 
necessarily mean that potentially anticompetitive mergers are cleared because of that 
uncertainty”.7 On 20 July 2021, the UK Government issued two consultations on reforming 
competition and consumer policy.8 In antitrust, amongst other wide ranging proposals, it is 
envisaged that the CMA may be granted powers to carry out sectoral inquiries faster, and to 
issue sector-wide interim orders;9 to speed up merger investigations;10 to have  “stronger and 
faster enforcement against illegal anticompetitive conduct”;11 potentially to limit the judicial 
scrutiny of the CMA decisions in competition law matters.12 As Pablo Ibáñez Colomo recently 
pointed out,13 behind some of these observed shifts there seems to be a new mistrust of 
procedural guarantees generally, and judicial review specifically. It also appears that “swift and 
decisive intervention” may now be prioritized “much more than getting it right”.14  
 
The recent crack-down against Big Tech in China has given a new dimension to this debate. 
On the one hand, the way and the speed with which China has been able to curb its Big Tech 
companies would appear to be the envy of some of the agencies mentioned above, but the very 
same speed and methods of enforcement have also shown important issues that arise when very 
 
7 Id. at ¶ 8. See also the statements of the ACCC’s Chairman Rod Sims in November 2020, highlighting the 
difficulties faced by the ACCC in merger control, particularly as regards “the weight the Federal Court gives to 
evidence from business executives of the merging parties”; the “Court’s approach to the evidence it requires 
from the ACCC in order to prove its case”. See Gilbert+Tobin, In conversation with Rod Sims: COVID-19 and 
the fitness and flexibility of Australia’s merger law (Dec. 1, 2020) 
https://www.gtlaw.com.au/insights/conversation-rod-sims-covid-19-fitness-flexibility-australias-merger-law 
(archived Aug. 26, 2021). 
8 UK Government, Reforming Competition and Consumer Policy’, Consultation (July 20, 2021) 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1004096/CCS
0721951242-001_Reforming_Competition_and_Consumer_Policy_Web_Accessible.pdf (archived Aug. 26, 
2021); UK Government, A new pro-competition regime for digital markets, Consultation (July 20, 2021) 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1003913/Digit
al_Competition_Consultation_v2.pdf (archived Aug. 26, 2021).  
9 UK Government, Reforming Competition and Consumer Policy, id., at ¶¶ 1.45–1.83. 
10 Id. at ¶¶ 1.119–1.127.  
11 Id. at ¶¶ 1.133–1.141.  
12 Id. at ¶¶ 1.200–1.208.  
13 Pablo Ibáñez Colomo, When did the rule of law come to be seen as an inconvenience? 
CHILLIN’COMPETITION Blog (June 30, 2021), https://chillingcompetition.com/2021/06/30/when-did-the-
rule-of-law-come-to-be-seen-as-an-inconvenience/ (archived August 15, 2021). 
14 Id. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931023
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wide discretion is granted to regulators in the absence of cogent judicial oversight. On the other 
hand, and at the somewhat opposite end of the scale, Hong Kong shows what happens when 
an adversarial enforcement of the rules is adopted, particularly in the context of a newly created 
system. In terms of Big Tech and regulation (but not yet antitrust), Hong Kong has quickly 
acquired the character of a new frontier: the new data law imposes a rethink for hitherto 
established social media and platforms, with ByteDance becoming the first company to 
announce the withdrawal of its app TikTok from Hong Kong, over a year ago.15  
 
This article takes a step back from the heat of the debate. The arguments in favor of a more 
robust enforcement of antitrust in highly concentrated markets are not in question. The issues 
that arise with Big Tech, in particular as regards increasing concentration in the digital sector, 
appear to be real,16 and the trend towards increased scrutiny of Big Tech is global. This has led 
some commentators to state that there is not much difference between the crackdown against 
Big Tech in China and in other countries.17 As Angela Zhang notes, “what makes China 
exceptional, however, is not why it regulates, but rather how it regulates its tech firms.”18 The 
focus here is not on reforming antitrust to tackle Big Tech. Rather, the competition laws of 
China and Hong Kong are considered from a comparative standpoint, to highlight that the form 
of antitrust intervention matters. 
 
15 Naomi Xu Elegant, TikTok is withdrawing its app from Hong Kong as tech reckons with new security law, 
FORTUNE (July 7, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/07/07/tiktok-hong-kong-app/ (archived Aug. 16, 2021). 
16 As regards the position of the Big Tech companies in the US, see for example Sean Markowicz, Big Tech’s 
market might in five charts, SCHRODERS (Sept. 16, 2020), 
https://www.schroders.com/en/insights/economics/big-techs-market-might-in-five-charts/ (archived Aug. 26, 
2021). See also THOMAS PHILIPPON, THE GREAT REVERSAL: HOW AMERICA GAVE UP ON FREE MARKETS, Table 
13.1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2019): out 
of the top ten global companies by market value in 2018, number 1 to 5 are, in the order: Apple, Amazon, 
Alphabet (Google’s parent), Microsoft and Facebook. Number 6 is Alibaba, number 8 is Tencent Holdings.  
17 See for example Zachary Karabell, China’s Didi Crackdown Isn’t All That Different From U.S. Moves 
Against Big Tech, TIME (July 9, 2021), https://time.com/6079121/chinas-didi-crackdown-big-tech/ (archived 
July 17, 2021).  
18 Angela H. Zhang, Agility over Stability: China’s Great Reversal in Regulating the Platform Economy (2021), 
at 5 (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3892642 (archived Aug. 20, 2021) (emphasis in 
original).  




China and Hong Kong share several cultural norms,19 but have had very different histories. 
Since 1997, Hong Kong has been part of China but has retained its own economic and 
administrative system under the constitutional principle known as the “One Country, Two 
Systems” rule. Both jurisdictions have adopted competition law recently and the newly set-up 
authorities are grappling with the universal issue of how to establish their legal authority, whilst 
facing different constraints. In China, the main constraint appears to be the internal 
bureaucracy, leading to a swinging pendulum between lax and strict regulation.20 In Hong 
Kong, the main constraints faced by the competition authorities appears to be the business 
community and a judiciary currently in flux between the opposite imperatives to safeguard the 
rights in the Basic Law and to accommodate a new reality.  
 
In this article, Section I provides a thorough overview of antitrust law in Hong Kong and in 
China, focusing on the substantive rules (in subsection A); the tools for detection and 
enforcement available to the competition authorities (in subsection B); and the institutional 
setup (in subsection C). The analysis is informed by recent case law in the two jurisdictions. 
Conclusions are drawn in section II.  
I. Antitrust Law in China and in Hong Kong 
China and Hong Kong are both jurisdictions with a relatively recent history of application of 
competition law.  
 
 
19 Chee Kiong Tong, Rethinking Chinese Business, in CHINESE BUSINESS, RETHINKING GUANXI AND TRUST IN 
CHINESE BUSINESS NETWORKS (Chee-Kiong Tong ed., 2014). See also Andreas Stephan, Cartel Laws 
Undermined: Corruption, Social Norms and Collectivist Business Cultures, 37 JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIETY, 
345 (2010).  
20 Zhang posits that the “volatile style of policymaking” in China is a result of the interaction of four key 
players: the top leadership, the agencies, the firms and the public. See Zhang, Agility over Stability, supra note 
18, at 5. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931023
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Legal provisions (laws and administrative rules) to tackle anticompetitive behavior existed in 
China prior to the adoption of the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML).21 The approach was 
piecemeal.22 For the purposes of this paper, particularly important are the Price Law,23 effective 
since 1 May 1998, a “consumer protection law with a few antitrust provisions outlawing 
cartels”24 including the prohibition to engage in price-fixing, and the Anti Unfair Competition 
Law,25 effective from 1 December 1993 which prohibits tying, below-cost pricing in certain 
cases, bid rigging and some other unfair trade practices. When the violations predated the entry 
into force of the AML, companies have been sanctioned for cartel behavior under the Price 
Law,26 and these laws remain in force today. In fact, they have been used to sanction businesses 
in the technology sector. On 8 February 2021 the Chinese State Administration for Market 
Regulation (SAMR), reportedly27 fined Vipshop RMB 3 million under the Anti Unfair 
Competition Law and Price Law (but not the AML), for imposing traffic limits on sellers also 
 
21 Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (中國人民共和國反壟斷法) promulgated by the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) (AML), 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/20130300045909.shtml 
(archived June 20, 2021). 
22 For details of the various provisions in force, including the Bidding Law, which came into force on 1 January 
2000, see Bruce M. Owen et al., China’s Competition Policy Reforms: The Anti-Monopoly Law and Beyond, 75 
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 231, 233 (2008). 
23 Price Law of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国价格法) promulgated by the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress (29 December 1997, effective 1 May 1998) (Price Law), 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/20130300046121.shtml 
(archived June 20, 2021). 
24 See for example Price Law, Chapter II: Price Acts of the Operators. See also ANGELA H. ZHANG, CHINESE 
ANTITRUST EXCEPTIONALISM (Oxford Univ. Press 2021), 66. 
25 Anti Unfair Competition Law of the People’s Republic of China (revised) (中华人民共和国反不正当竞争法 [
已被修订]) promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (2 September 1993, 
effective 1 December 1993, revised in 2017 and 2019) (Anti Unfair Competition Law), 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200211/20021100050495.html (archived 16 August 
2021). 
26 The first extraterritorial application of Chinese competition law concerned the enforcement of the Price Law: 
see the 2013 decision of the NDRC (one of the antitrust enforcers before the creation of the SAMR in 2018) in 
the international LCD Panel Manufacturing Cartel, sanctioning violations that pre-dated the entry into force of 
the AML. See Samson Yuen, Taming the “Foreign Tigers”: China’s Anti-trust Crusade Against Multinational 
Companies, 4 CHINA PERSPECTIVES (2014), http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/6587 (archived 10 September 
2020). See also Hannah Ha, John Hickin and Philip Monaghan, China, in CARTELS: ENFORCEMENT, APPEALS & 
DAMAGES ACTIONS 37 (Nigel Parr and Euan Burrows eds, 2014).  
27 Yong Bai and Dave Poddar, Antitrust in China and Across the Region, CLIFFORD CHANCE QUARTERLY 
UPDATE (January to March 2021) www.cliffordchance.com/content/dam/cliffordchance/briefings/2021/04/asia-
pacific-quarterly-antitrust-briefing---q1-2021.pdf (archived July 17, 2021). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931023
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active on other platforms (an early instance of the so-called “choose one from two” practice 
that was the main theory of harm in the Alibaba decision considered below).28 In an even earlier 
case, on 30 December 2020 reportedly SAMR announced “in a social media post” that it had 
issued fines of RMB 500,000 for unspecified issues of “irregular pricing” against Alibaba’s 
Tmall; Jingdong (Alibaba’s competitor) and Vipshop:29 this appears to be the first case when 
tech companies were sanctioned in China. More generally, investigations can also be carried 
out under the AML and one of the other laws (such as the Price Law).30  
In Hong Kong, competition law was initially adopted on a sectoral basis (notably 
telecommunications and broadcasting were subject to competition rules since the early 2000)31 
alongside the enforcement of regulation. It is an interesting observation that often competition 
law makes its first appearance in a jurisdiction in the telecommunications sector. This is true 
of countries as diverse as the UK, where modern provisions to tackle anticompetitive 
 
28 See infra section I, A, 2. 
29 Yilei Sun et al., China fines JD.Com, Alibaba’s Tmall Vipshop for irregular pricing, REUTERS (Dec. 30, 
2020) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-market-regulation-idUSKBN29413C (archived Aug. 16, 2021). 
More details about the behavior sanctioned can be found in: Xu Wei, China Fines JD, Tmall and Vipshop for 
Shady Double-11 Shopping Event Promos, YICAI GLOBAL (Dec. 31, 2021) 
https://www.yicaiglobal.com/news/chinese-e-tailers-jdcom-tmall-vipshop-get-slapped-with-usd77000-each-for-
shady-promos (archived Aug. 27, 2021). Unfortunately, from the information available it is not possible to 
understand the legal basis for this fine.  
30 See for example one of the very first cartel cases, the 2010 Rice Noodles Cartel, investigated by the Guanxi 
Price Bureau under the Price Law and the AML. See Xue Qiang, Yang Xixi, Anti-Cartel Law and Enforcement 
in China: A Survey, in CHINA'S ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW: THE FIRST FIVE YEARS ¶ 6.03 (Adrian Emch and David 
Stallibrass eds., 2013); Alert Memo, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, First Price Cartel Cases Under the 
Chinese AML (May 21, 2010), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/organize-archive/cgsh/files/publication-
pdfs/first-price-cartel-cases-under-the-chinese-aml.pdf (archived Aug. 27, 2021). See also the Xiamen Courier 
Industry Price Self-Discipline Convention Cartel (Xiamen Price Bureau, 2014) University of Melbourne, CHINA 
COMPETITION BULLETIN (March/April 2014), at 5, 
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/1796462/China-Competition-Bulletin-March-April-
2014.pdf (archived Aug. 27, 2021).  
31 Since the enactment of the Telecommunications Ordinance (電訊條例) (2000) (Cap 106) 
https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap106 (archived July 6, 2021); and the Broadcasting Ordinance (廣播條例) 
(2000) (Cap 562) https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap562!en-zh-Hant-HK (archived July 6, 2021). See 
Sandra Marco Colino, A History of Competition: The Impact of Antitrust on Hong Kong’s Telecommunications 
Markets, 29 FORDHAM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL 931 (2019). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931023
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agreements and abuses of a dominant position were first introduced in the telecommunications 
licence of the incumbent, British Telecoms,32 Singapore,33 Bahrain,34 and The Bahamas.35 
 
The debate whether to adopt a comprehensive competition law started in China in the early 
1990s; the accession of China to the WTO in 2001 provided a powerful argument in favour of 
enactment and in 2008 the AML came into force, “after fourteen years of wrangling and 
debate”.36 As has been noted,37 “when a law takes so long to enact in China, that usually 
signifies that it is highly controversial”.38  
 
In Hong Kong, the adoption of the Competition Ordinance (CO)39 followed two decades of 
debate “as to whether such legislation was compatible with the region’s free market 
economy.”40 There was considerable resistance among industry and government to adopt an 
all-encompassing competition law, and there was a widespread view that Hong Kong did not 
require it, as it was a small and externally oriented economy, considered already highly 
competitive, although there is a perception in Hong Kong itself that competitiveness does not 
 
32 In the UK, prior to the adoption of the Competition Act 1998 (which came into force in 2000), a 
comprehensive system of review of anticompetitive agreements and abuses of dominance along the European 
model was to be found only in BT’s telecommunications licence, following an amendment by the then regulator, 
Oftel to include the so-called ‘fair trading condition’. See R v Director General of Telecommunications ex parte 
British Telecommunications plc, [1996] England and Wales High Court Admin 391. 
33 Singapore adopted sector specific competition laws for the telecoms sector following its full liberalisation in 
April 2000. In September 2000, the Infocomm Development Authority of Singapore (iDA) introduced the Code 
of Practice for Competition in the Provision of Telecommunications Services (the Telecom Competition Code), 
under s 26 of the Telecommunication Act. 
34 Legislative Decree No. 48 of 2002 (the Telecommunications Law). 
35 Bahamas Communications Act 2009, published in the Official Gazette on 2 June 2009. The relevant 
competition provisions are found in ‘Part XI – Competition Provisions’. Prior to the Communications Act 
coming into force, there were general ‘fair competition’ conditions in the telecommunications licences. 
36 Angela H. Zhang, Taming the Chinese Leviathan: Is Antitrust Regulation a False Hope?, STANFORD 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 195, 196 (2015) 
37 Owen et al., supra note 22. 
38 Id. at 232. 
39 Competition Ordinance (競爭條例) (Cap 619), promulgated by the Legislative Council, 12 June 2012, 
effective 14 December 2015 (CO) https://www.elegislation.gov.hk/hk/cap619 (archived July 6, 2021). 
40 Sandra Marco Colino, Distribution Agreements under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law and the Hong Kong 
Competition Ordinance, 1 CHINA ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 1, 2 (2017). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931023
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extend to all domestic sectors, notably business-to-consumer (such as grocery).41 The adoption 
of a generally applicable competition law in Singapore in 2004 might have been a factor in the 
government’s decision in 2007 to adopt the CO.42 Eventually, the CO was promulgated in June 
2012, but came fully into force only on 14 December 2015, following a lengthy implementation 
period during which both the Hong Kong Competition Commission (HKCC)43 and the Hong 
Kong Competition Tribunal (HKCT) were created.44  
 
A. The Substantive Provisions of the Law 
As has been noted,45 the adoption and enforcement of a legislation that “grew from the soil of 
Western democracy and free market economy” in China is remarkable, in light of the historical 
and political realities, where “the demarcation line between normal market activities and illegal 
profit making is sometimes vague.”46 If in socialist countries such as China competition law 
can be considered a tool towards the developments of free markets, seen with suspicion, in 
advanced capitalistic societies such as Hong Kong, competition law may be seen with suspicion 
for the opposite reason, as imposing unnecessary constraints on existing free markets: the 
adoption of a comprehensive competition law in Hong Kong is equally surprising.  
 
When the AML was finally adopted in China, and the CO was adopted in Hong Kong, however, 
the substantive provisions of the law were remarkably similar, and in fact modelled on, 
 
41 CONOR QUIGLEY AND SUZANNE RAB, HONG KONG COMPETITION LAW (Bloomsbury, 2017), at 293. See also 
Mark Williams, The Lion City and the Fragrant Harbour: The political economy of competition policy in Hong 
Kong and Singapore compared THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN 517, 541 (2009): ‘(w)hilst the externally traded 
sector is privately owned, diverse and internationally competitive, many sectors of the domestic economy are 
very concentrated and dominated by a small number of family controlled … conglomerates’. 
42 Ping Lin and Thomas W Ross, Toward a more robust competition policy regime for Hong Kong, JOURNAL OF 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 109, 112 (2021); QUIGLEY AND RAB, supra note 41, at 2. 
43 CO, supra note 39, at Part 9. The HKCC’s functions are detailed in section 130. 
44 CO, supra note 39, at section 135. 
45 Zhang, Taming the Chinese Leviathan, supra note 36, at 195–196. 
46 Ting Gong, Whistleblowing: what does it mean in China?, 23 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 1899, 1916 (2000). 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931023
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precedents from the EU, and Singapore, immediately recognizable to competition lawyers the 
world over.  
 
Looking at enforcement in the digital sector, the reported cases in China are mostly against 
domestic Big Tech for abuse of a dominant position or for non-compliance with the merger 
rules. The cases for abuse of a dominant position tend to be focused on anticompetitive 
practices of dominant marketplace platforms that favor certain merchants over others. One of 
the most pressing concerns against platforms in the EU, namely the loss of control over 
personal data,47 is not a concern in China. The SAMR Platform Economy Guidelines,48 issued 
in February 2021, include a section on the potential that agreements entered into by platforms 
may breach the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements, including by platform operators 
requiring users to offer terms and trading conditions at least equal than those offered on other 
platforms (so called “parity” clauses).49 However, it appears that agreements amongst e-
commerce and online providers have not been investigated as anticompetitive agreements 
under the AML.  
 
On the contrary, in Hong Kong only one case was brought in the online/digital sector, against 
online travel agent for anticompetitive “parity clauses” with hotels for the provisions of 
accommodation in Hong Kong.50 
 
 
47 See for example the German case against Facebook, where the Bundeskartellamt found that Facebook had 
engaged in ‘abusive data processing policy’. See Press Release, Bundeskartellamt, Bundeskartellamt prohibits 
Facebook from combining user data from different sources (Feb. 7, 2019) 
https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2019/07_02_2019_Facebook.ht
ml (archived July 19, 2021). 
48 SAMR, THE ANTI-MONOPOLY GUIDELINES OF THE ANTI-MONOPOLY COMMISSION OF THE STATE COUNCIL ON 
THE PLATFORM ECONOMY [hereinafter Platform Economy Guidelines]  
(国务院反垄断委员会关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南) (Feb. 7, 2021) 
http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/fldj/202102/t20210207_325967.html (archived Aug. 25, 2021. 
49 Id. at art 7. 
50 In this case, the HKCC accepted commitments and settled the case. It is considered at s I, B, 2, infra. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931023
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It is noteworthy that the recent wave of antitrust enforcement in the digital sector in China 
follows a number of statements by the top leadership in China in December 2020 about the 
importance of antitrust enforcement for the “prevention of the disorderly expansion of 
capital”,51 and “curbing monopolistic behavior”.52 As more particularly analyzed below,53 this 
highlights a characteristic of the enforcement system in China, resulting in a pendulum between 
initial lax enforcement and quick and decisive action after the top leadership decides to 
intervene. Angela Zhang54 has persuasively argued that this makes the regulatory response to 
perceived issues more agile, at the expenses of stability. The SAMR was swift in taking action: 
its Draft Antitrust Guidelines on the Platform Economy,55 were issued in November 2020 (just 
before the pronouncements by the top leadership), followed by the final guidelines in February 
2021.56 The year 2021 also marks the beginning of robust enforcement of these rules against 
Big Tech in China.  
 
1. The prohibition against Anticompetitive Agreements 
In both China and Hong Kong, the prohibitions against anticompetitive agreements are drafted 
broadly in line with precedent from other jurisdictions, in particular the EU and Singapore (but 
 
51 Politburo meeting chaired by President Xi Jinping on 11 December 2020. “Xi Focus: Xi chairs leadership 
meeting on economic work for 2021”, XINHUANET (Dec. 11, 2021), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-
12/11/c_139582746.htm (archived Aug. 27, 2021). This was followed by other pronouncements specifically on 
the tech sector. See Zheping Huang, Xi warns Against Tech Excess in Sign Crackdown Will Widen, BLOOMBERG 
LAW (March 16, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/antitrust/xi-warns-against-tech-excess-in-sign-
crackdown-will-widen?context=article-related (archived Aug. 25, 2021). 
52 Central Economic Work Conference, 18 December 2020. This is the keynote annual conference where 
China’s economic priorities for the coming year are announced. Curbing monopolistic behavior is one of eight 
major policy priorities for 2021. See also “China holds key economic meeting to plan for 2021” XINHUANET 
(Dec. 18, 2021), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-12/18/c_139601199.htm (archived Aug. 25, 2021). 
53 See infra section I.C.2. 
54 Zhang, Agility over Stability, supra note 18, at 5. 
55 SAMR, Announcement of the SAMR on Public Consultation on the “Guidelines for Anti-Monopoly in the 
Field of Platform Economy (Draft for Comment) (市场监管总局关于《关于平台经济领域的 
反垄断指南（征求意见稿）》公开征求意见的公告) (10 November 2020) 
http://www.samr.gov.cn/hd/zjdc/202011/t20201109_323234.html (archived Aug. 27, 2021).  
56 Platform Economy Guidelines, supra note 48. 
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similar provisions are to be found in the competition laws of Australia, New Zealand and the 
US), although there appear to be differences in the treatment of vertical agreements.  
As regards horizontal agreements, in both jurisdictions, the fight against price-fixing cartels is 
a focus of enforcement. In Hong Kong, the HKCC acknowledges this specifically,57 and this is 
borne out by the case law. In its barely six years of operation, seven procedures were 
commenced by the HKCC;58 six of them concerned Serious Anti-competitive Conduct,59 which 
broadly refers to hard-core cartel agreements (in five cases,60 price fixing was an issue). Only 
one case related to a breach of the Second Conduct Rule.61 In China, reports exist of at least 95 
cases, at the central and at the local level, where the antitrust authorities have acted against the 
parties for “price fixing”,62 although, as Angela Zhang63 points out, the cases in the public 
domain do not show the full picture: officials she interviewed indicated that many more cases 
were investigated than have been disclosed.”64  
In China, article 13 of the AML prohibits so-called “monopoly agreements”.65 These include 
hard-core cartel agreements (price fixing;66 output restrictions67 (and agreements that restrict 
 
57 See Press Release, HKCC, Competition Commission launches “Combat Price Fixing Cartels” Campaign 
(Nov. 9, 2020), 
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/EN_PR_CC_launches_Combat_Price_Fixing_Cartels_Campai
gn_20201109.pdf (archived July 8, 2021). 
58 All cases in the HKCT and all judgments are published on the website of the HKCC. HKCC, Cases in the 
Competition Tribunal, www.compcomm.hk/en/enforcement/enforcement/competition_tribunal.html (archived 8 
July 2021). 
59 As defined in CO, supra note 39, at s 2(1). 
60 Competition Commission v Nutanix Hong Kong Ltd & Others, CTEA1/2017 (Nutanix Bid Rigging); 
Competition Commission v W Hing Construction Company & Others, CTEA2/2017; Competition Commission v 
Kam Kwong Engineering Company Ltd & Others, CTEA1/2018; Competition Commission v Fungs E&M 
Engineering Company Limited & Others, CTEA1/2019; Competition Commission v Quantr Limited and 
Cheung Man Kit, CTEA1/2020; Competition Commission v T.H. Lee Book Company Limited & Others, 
CTEA2/2020.  
61 Competition Commission v Linde HKO Limited Tse Chun Wah and Linde GmbH (21 December 2020) 
CTEA3/2020.  
62 Exhaustive reports of cases decided by the competition authorities in China are often not available. The 
information on the 95 cases mentioned has been compiled from secondary sources, referred to in the footnotes. 
63 ZHANG, CHINESE ANTITRUST EXCEPTIONALISM, supra note 24.  
64 Id. at 94. 
65 AML, supra note 21, at art. 13.  
66 AML, supra note 21, at art. 13(1). 
67 AML, supra note 21, at art. 13(2). 
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the development of new technologies);68 allocating markets;69 and boycotts).70 Although the 
notion of a “monopoly agreement” seems to imply a measure of market power for the parties 
to the agreement, it is understood that this provision captures anticompetitive agreements, 
similar to art 101 TFEU in the EU, or the First Conduct Rule under the Competition Ordinance 
of Hong Kong.71 Anticompetitive agreements can be exempted under article 15 of the AML, if 
the parties can prove that their agreements lead to improvements to technological development 
or research (article 15(1); improves product quality and efficiency (article 15(2); achieves 
social public interest benefits, including environmental protection (article 15(4));72 or for crisis 
(article 15(5)) and export cartels (article 15(6)). Similar to the conditions for the application of 
article 101(3) TFEU, these exemptions can only apply if the gains are shared by the consumers 
and provided that there are no severe restrictions of competition.73  
 
In Hong Kong, anticompetitive agreements or practices are prohibited under the so-called First 
Conduct Rule.74 The CO includes a general exclusion from the First Conduct Rule for 
agreements that enhance overall economic efficiency, with the same cumulative requirements 
as found in article 101(3) TFEU, and, broadly, article 15 of the AML, namely that: the 
agreement contributes to improving production or distribution or technical or economic 
progress; consumers receive a fair share of the efficiencies and the restriction imposed must be 
 
68 AML, supra note 21, at art. 13(4). 
69 AML, supra note 21, at art. 13(3). 
70 AML, supra note 21, at art. 13(5). 
71 Colino, Distribution Agreements, supra note 40, at 22–23.  
72 Art. 15(4) is sometimes quoted in the debate on competition law and sustainability, as a possible model that 
could be followed in other jurisdictions. 
73 For example, in the Mayang Shale Brick Cartel, the parties invoked art. 15 but the exemption was not granted 
as the cartel caused serious harm to competition and harmed consumer interests. See Mayang Shale Brick Cartel 
(Hainan AIC, 2015) University of Melbourne, CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN (May/June 2015), at 5 
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/1796449/China-Competition-Bulletin-May-June-
2015.pdf (archived Aug. 27, 2021). 
74 CO, supra note 39, at Division 1, Subdivision 1. See also HKCC, GUIDELINE—THE FIRST CONDUCT RULE 
(2015).  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3931023
15 
 
indispensable and do not eliminate competition altogether.75 The HKCC interprets the relevant 
provisions as a “defence” in response to an allegation that the First Conduct Rule has been 
contravened.76 Although cartel activity and price fixing specifically are instances of Serious 
Anti-competitive Conduct, as defined,77 under the terms of the CO, there is nothing to indicate 
that this defence would not be available in cartel cases and in fact, this defence was argued in 
one of the first cases to be brought to the HKCT, the Decoration Contractors cartel case.78 As 
has been remarked, if this precedent were followed in the future, the law in Hong Kong would 
have already “moved away from standard best practice”, as it would admit evidence of 
efficiencies in collusion cases.79 
 
Concerning vertical agreements, in China, Article 14 of the AML specifically prohibits 
“monopoly agreements” between “business operators and their trading parties” that “fix the 
price” for “resale to a third party”. Although this provision may appear to outlaw retail price 
maintenance (RPM) agreements, looking at articles 13, 14 and 15 together, it seems that the 
AML establishes a “prohibition plus exemption” regime for both anticompetitive horizontal 
and vertical agreements (such as RPM). These are unlawful, unless an exemption applies under 
article 15. However, in China the case law80 suggests that resale price maintenance is subject 
 
75 CO, supra note 39, at s I of Schedule I. 
76 HKCC, GUIDELINE—THE FIRST CONDUCT RULE, supra note 74, at ¶ 4.3. 
77 CO, supra note 39, at s 2(1). See also HKCC, GUIDELINE—THE FIRST CONDUCT RULE at ¶ 5.4, ¶ 6.15. 
78 Competition Commission v Hing Construction Co Ltd & Others [2019] HKCT 3 (Decoration Contractors 
case) (Liability Judgment). 
79 Lin and Ross, supra note 42, at 120. 
80 Investigations can be carried out under art 13 and 14 AML: see for example the cases against (foreign) car 
distributors: Hubei Car Distribution Cartel (Hubei Price Bureau, 2014) University of Melbourne, CHINA 
COMPETITION BULLETIN (September/October 2014), at 2, 
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/1796478/China-Competition-Bulletin-September-
October-2014.pdf (archived June 20, 2021); Guandong Nissan Distributors Cartel (Guangdong DRC, 2015) 
University of Melbourne, CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN (September/October 2015), at 6, 
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/1796445/China-Competition-Bulletin-September-
October-2015-3.pdf (archived June 20, 2021). See also Infant Formula Milk Cartel (NDRC, 2011), discussed in 
Ha, Hickin and Monaghan, supra note 26, at 42. This is an RPM case in which, very unusually, three companies 
received total immunity, against the NDRC’s own guidelines. 
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to a prohibition rule, making it unlawful irrespective of its impact of competition:81 the 
authorities often treat such agreements as if they were a form of price fixing cartel. As has been 
remarked by Sandra Marco Colino,82 the adoption of a “bright line approach” of per se illegality 
of RPM agreements is probably understandable in a jurisdiction where competition law has 
been adopted recently. This is also the approach taken by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) 
in the only appeal to date that was successful in the first instance (and then reversed).83  
 
In Hong Kong, the HKCC takes the view that vertical arrangements are generally unlikely to 
be considered Serious Anti-Competitive Conduct, although a literal reading of section 2(1) of 
the CO would not exclude this possibility, and “in certain circumstances, resale price 
maintenance may constitute an instance of Serious Anti-competitive conduct.”84 As has been 
noted, although vertical restraints generally are assumed to benefit the party “higher up in the 
chain of production”,85 the immediate beneficiaries of resale price maintenance tend to be the 
retailers, which request it to protect their investment. This may be a reason why the HKCC 
specified that resale price maintenance will always be considered under the First Conduct 
Rule,86 although theoretically it could also be an abuse of market power. In the Nutanix Bid 
Rigging judgment,87 the HKCT took a strict view of a case where the anticompetitive conduct 
in question consisted of several bilateral vertical agreements between an upstream supplier and 
downstream resellers, in an arrangement reminiscent of a “hub and spoke” agreement. Unlike 
in precedents from the EU and the UK, the HKCT did not consider whether the resellers were 
 
81 On the difference between rules and standards, see PABLO IBÁÑEZ COLOMO, THE SHAPING OF EU 
COMPETITION LAW 30; 64–67 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2018). 
82 Colino, Distribution Agreements, supra note 40, at 34. 
83 See infra footnote 264. 
84 The exclusion is in CO, supra note 39, at section 5 of Schedule I. See GUIDELINE—THE FIRST CONDUCT 
RULE, supra note 74, at ¶¶ 5.5–5.6. 
85 SANDRA MARCO COLINO, COMPETITION LAW OF THE EU AND UK 190 (Oxford Univ. Press 8th ed. 2019). 
86 HKCC, GUIDELINE—THE FIRST CONDUCT RULE, supra note 74, at ¶¶ 6.71–6.77. 
87 Competition Commission v Nutanix Hong Kong Ltd [2019] HKCT 2 (Nutanix Bid Rigging) (Liability 
Judgment). 
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aware of the arrangement, therefore making it possible to sanction a series of vertical 
agreements with a “horizontal element”, as a cartel.88  
 
The SAMR is very much aware of the potential for data and algorithms to lead to illegal 
collusion between competitors;89 to facilitate vertical anticompetitive agreements; 90 and 
facilitate the creation and maintenance of hub-and-spoke agreements.91 These factors are 
mentioned in the Platform Economy Guidelines, although not in any detail. This perhaps 
signals that the SAMR will be keeping these aspects under review in the near future. The 
Platform Economy Guidelines, also signal that the SAMR will consider issues relating to 
“parity” clauses in contracts for online services.92 To date, agreements amongst e-commerce 
and online providers do not appear to have been investigated as anticompetitive agreements 
under the AML, although local e-commerce companies have reportedly blown the whistle on 
cartels in the courier industry.93  
 
The existence of parity clauses in the contracts of online travel agents provides the only 
example of enforcement in the online/digital sector in Hong Kong. As this case was settled by 
the HKCC, it will be considered below.94 
 
2. Abuse of a Dominant Position 
 
88 See also Marcus Pollard and Kathleen Gooi, Work in Progress: Hong Kong’s Competition Law Five Years 
On, 11 JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 372, 375–376 (2020). 
89 Platform Economy Guidelines, supra note 48. 
90 Id. at art. 7. 
91 Id. at art. 8. 
92 Id. at art. 7. 
93 In the Xiamen Courier Industry Price Self-Discipline Convention Cartel, supra note 30, e-commerce 
companies were said to have driven down the profits of the courier companies, and this was considered one 
reason for the cartel. See also Ningxia Courier Companies Cartel (Ningxia Price Bureau, 2014) University of 
Melbourne, CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN (March/April 2014), at 6, 
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/1796424/China-Competition-Bulletin-Jan-Feb-2015.pdf 
(archived Aug. 27, 2021). 
94 See infra section I.B.2. 
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In both China and Hong Kong, the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position appears to be 
drafted in line with European (and Singapore) precedent.  
 
In Hong Kong, the Second Conduct Rule95 prohibits businesses with substantial market power 
from abusing it. The Guideline issued by the Competition Commission makes it clear that the 
notion of a “substantial degree of market power” is interpreted in line with the notion of 
dominance in EU law.96 Since the CO has been in force, only one proceeding was brought for 
a breach of the Second Conduct Rule,97 in December 2020. It is alleged that the respondent, 
Linde HKO Limited, abused its position of substantial market power in the market for the 
supply of medical gases in Hong Kong, at the time of the Covid-19 pandemic. Linde is accused 
of engaging in exclusionary practices against the only other potential competitor in the supply 
to public hospitals. According to the HKCC, these practices include unjustified denial of supply 
of medical gases, and the imposition of unreasonable terms. This is also the first case in Hong 
Kong where one of the respondents, Linde Gmbh, is a non-Hong Kong based business.  
 
In China, firms that have a dominant position are required under article 6 of the AML98 not to 
abuse it. Article 17 provides a list of practices considered abusive.99 This includes exclusive 
dealing as a theory of harm. Up until October 2020, there had not been cases for abuse of 
dominance against Big Tech in China. In a paper published in July 2020,100 the authors provide 
statistics up to the end of June 2020. Up to them, there had been 48 investigations, and the most 
 
95 CO, supra note 39, at s 21(1). 
96 HKCC, GUIDELINE: THE SECOND CONDUCT RULE (2015) Part 3. 
97 Competition Commission v Linde HKO Limited Tse Chun Wah and Linde GmbH (21 December 2020) 
CTEA3/2020.  
98 AML, supra note 21, at art. 6.  
99 AML, supra note 21, at art. 17. 
100 Cheng Liu, Yun Bi and Jeff Liu, Most Targeted Industries and Conduct in China’s Antitrust Investigations 
against Abuse of Dominance, CPI COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL (30 July 2020), 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/most-targeted-industries-and-conduct-in-chinas-antitrust-
investigations-against-abuse-of-dominance/ (archived Aug. 20, 2021). 
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frequently targeted industries were, first, public utilities; second, active pharmaceutical 
ingredients (API); followed by high tech and IP. At that time, although the SAMR had “started 
to pay closer attention to the conduct of the major internet giants”, they had not yet “officially 
penalized any internet platform companies.” This was so, even though in 2019 the SAMR had 
issued its “Interim Provisions on Prohibiting Abuse of Market Dominant Position”101 whose 
article 11 mentioned factors to be considered in assessing “the Internet and other new economic 
business operators”. Thereafter, things escalated quickly. 
 
In the Platform Economy Guidelines,102 the “ability to master and process relevant data”103 is 
a factor to be considered when assessing market dominance together with “ease of data 
acquisition”, one of a number of barriers to entry or expansion.104 The SAMR expressly 
considers that platforms may constitute an essential facility;105 and that big data and algorithms 
can aid price differentiation and other anticompetitive differential treatment.106 Article 15 of 
the Platform Economy Guidelines, entitled “Restricted Transactions” deals with issues of 
restrictive dealing. Specifically, art 15(1) states that “behaviors that require operators on the 
platform to “choose one of two” among competing platforms or restrict the counterparty to the 
transaction to conduct exclusive transactions with them” can constitute abuse of dominance. 
The SAMR recognizes in article 15 that punitive measures (“such as blocking stores, searching 
rights, traffic restrictions, technical obstacles and deducting deposit”) are more serious than 
seeking to incentivize users to choose only one platform. In the second case, the dominant 
player may seek to grant “subsidies, discounts, preferential treatments, traffic resource support 
 
101 SAMR, INTERIM PROVISIONS ON PROHIBITING ABUSE OF MARKET DOMINANT POSITION (禁止滥用市场支配地位行
为暂行规定) (July 1, 2019), http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/fgs/201907/t20190701_303057.html (archived Aug. 20, 2021). 
102 Platform Economy Guidelines, supra note 48. 
103 Id. at art. 11(3). 
104 Id. at art. 11(5). 
105 Id. at art. 14. 
106 Id. at art. 17(1). 
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etc.” and this may have positive effects on “the interests of operators and consumers on the 
platform, and the overall welfare of society”. The SAMR also lists a number of “legitimate 
reasons for restricting transactions.” 
 
None of these must have been applicable to the practices of Alibaba Group. On 10 April 2021, 
the SAMR imposed a fine of RMB 18.228 billion107 (approximately US$2.8 billion) against 
Alibaba Group Holdings Limited (Alibaba) for abuse of a dominant position by engaging in 
“choose one from two” behavior. The decision was very widely reported in the global media,108 
although the practice of “choose one from two” has been a concern in Chinese antitrust since 
at least 2017.109 The notoriety of Alibaba and the perceived magnitude of the fine—more than 
double the previously highest fine imposed under the AML in China, RMB 6.088 billion 
(approximately US$939 million) against Qualcomm, caught the public’s imagination. It is 
sobering to reflect, however that in terms of percentage of turnover, this fine equates to only 4 
percent of Alibaba’s turnover in China in the previous year.110  
 
Because of its importance, it is worth considering the Alibaba decision in some detail. First, 
substantively the SAMR applies the law against abuse of a dominant position in the AML and 
 
107 Press Release, SAMR, The SAMR imposed administrative penalties on Alibaba Group Holdings Limited’s 
“choose one from two” policy in the online retail platform service market in China in accordance with the law  
(市场监管总局依法对阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司在中国境内网络零售平台服务市场实施"二选一"垄断行为作出行
政处罚) (10 April 2021) http://www.samr.gov.cn/xw/zj/202104/t20210410_327702.html (archived July 24, 
2021). This is a press release attaching two documents (in Mandarin): a ‘Penalty Notice’ and an ‘Administrative 
Instructions Document’.  
108 See for example Raymond Zhong, China Fines Alibaba $2.8 Billion in Landmark Antitrust Case, THE NEW 
YORK TIMES (Apr. 9, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/09/technology/china-alibaba-monopoly-
fine.html (archived Aug. 16, 2021); Ryan McMorrow and Yuan Yang, Chinese regulators fine Alibaba record 
$2.8bn, THE FINANCIAL TIMES (Apr. 10, 2021,) https://www.ft.com/content/bb251dcc-4bff-4883-9d81-
061114fee87f (archived August 16, 2021). 
109 In an article published in March 2021, the authors report that this practice triggered at least eight antitrust and 
unfair competition investigations in the platform economy since 2017. See Wei Huang and others, Antitrust 
Guidelines for the Platform Economy in the Era of Enhanced Antitrust Scrutiny, COMPETITION POLICY 
INTERNATIONAL (March 29, 2021), Footnote 9 https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/antitrust-
guidelines-for-the-platform-economy-in-the-era-of-enhanced-antitrust-scrutiny/ (archived Aug. 25, 2021). 
110 See infra section I.A.4. 
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in the Platform Economy Guidelines. Alibaba is found to have abused its dominant position in 
the market for online retail platform services in China through the imposition of a number of 
restrictions on merchants seeking to use platforms other than the Alibaba’s platforms (“choose 
one from two” policy). Broadly, the abuse therefore consists of seeking to impose restrictive 
dealings by implementing sophisticated incentive/penalty measures on firms that do not 
comply with exclusivity requirement. This is a recognized theory of harm in many jurisdictions 
around the world.  
 
Second, procedurally, in the Penalty Notice we read: “the parties waived the right to make 
statements, defenses and to request a hearing” (“当事人放弃陈述、申辩和要求举行听证的权”). 
This is a startling admission from a Western perspective: the companies that are subject to a 
large fine in countries of mature enforcement of the competition laws tend to appeal the 
decisions through different grades of appeal.111 Not so in China and the reasons for this are 
complex and will be considered below.112 
 
Third, the decision is published in two documents attached to a press release: a Penalty Notice 
comprising 27 pages of analysis and leading to the order to stop the illegal acts and pay the 
fine, and an Administrative Instruction Document which is three pages long and provides 
details of the actions that Alibaba is expected to undertake in order to comply with the order: 
Alibaba must draw up a rectification plan and submit annual compliance reports for the next 
three years. Again, this is a departure from the norm in decisions reached by Western 
 
111 For example, according to its Annual Report 2020, the General Court of the EU (the court of first instance) in 
2020 completed 41 state aid and competition cases; 78 competition cases were still pending at the end of 2020. 
104 state aid and competition cases were pending before the Court of Justice (on appeal) at the end of 2020. See 
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE YEAR IN REVIEW—ANNUAL REPORT 2020 (2021) 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2021-04/ra_pan_2020_en.pdf (archived Aug. 26, 
2021). 
112 See infra section I.C.2. 
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competition authorities: by way of comparison, the EU decision against Google in the Google 
(Shopping) case113 reaches 215 pages in length. This aspect is linked to the point above: given 
that the parties accept the findings of the authorities in China, the authorities do not need to 
prove their case to the same extent.  
 
Finally, the decision was reached with incredible speed by Western standards: only three 
months to close the investigation. This has led commentators to praise the decision as 
“thoughtful and impressive”.114 Whilst one can sympathize with the frustration generated by 
protracted cases such as the Google (Shopping) case mentioned above,115 that lasted about 8 
years and is under appeal in Europe,116 it is important to consider the Alibaba decision in its 
context, as highlighted above.  
 
Further to the Alibaba decision, other companies are rumored to be in the firing line for 
forthcoming penalties for abuse of a dominant position. According to press reports, food 
delivery giant Meituan may be facing a “roughly US$1 billion fine”,117 in the near future. 
 
3. Merger Control 
In Hong Kong, the CO includes a prohibition of mergers that substantially lessen competition 
or that are likely to do so.118 Like in other jurisdictions, notably Singapore and the UK, merger 
control is voluntary, in the sense that the parties can decide not to notify after self-assessment.  
 
 
113 Google Search (Shopping) (Case COMP/ AT.39740) Summary of Commission Decision [2017] OJ C9/11. 
114 See for example Bai and Poddar, supra note 27. 
115 Id. 
116 Jane Wakefield, Google starts appeal against £2bn shopping fine BBC (Feb. 12, 2020), 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-51462397 (archived Aug. 26, 2021). 
117 Bhaswati Guha Majumder, Chinese Antitrust Regulator to impose $1 Billion Fine on Food-Delivery Giant 
Meituan SWARAJYA (Aug. 7, 2021), https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/chinese-antitrust-regulator-to-impose-
1-billion-fine-on-food-delivery-giant-meituan (archived Aug. 26, 2021). 
118 CO, supra note 39, at schedule 7, s 3. 
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Although the Merger Control Rule is drafted in general terms, for historical reasons it only 
applies to mergers in the telecommunications sector, where one of the parties is a 
telecommunications carrier licensee.119 Given this, the main authority that will consider 
mergers in Hong Kong is the Communications Authority, which has concurrent jurisdiction in 
competition law matters with the HKCC.120 Further, the authorities in Hong Kong are 
specifically barred from assessing the compatibility of mergers agreements with the First or 
the Second Conduct Rule:121 it appears from the Merger Rule Guidelines issued by the 
HKCC,122 that the HKCC takes the view that any ancillary restrictions (such as non-compete 
clauses) are also excluded from review, when they are directly related and necessary to the 
implementation of the merger.123 
 
This blanket exclusion has a number of consequences.124 First, other jurisdictions may have 
more of a saying on mergers that affect consumers in Hong Kong, than the Hong Kong 
authorities themselves. For example, when Cathay Pacific acquired Hong Kong Express 
Airways in 2019, the transaction was reviewed and approved by the Taiwan Fair Trade 
Commission, for the competition aspects affecting Taiwan passengers but could not be assessed 
for its effect on the relevant markets in Hong Kong.125 Further, the original rationale to subject 
the telecommunications industry to a more intrusive regulatory burden than other sectors has 
 
119 The Merger Rule in the CO is substantially similar to s 7P(1) of the Telecommunication Ordinance. 
120 See HKCC AND COMMUNICATIONS AUTHORITY, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (2015), ¶ 1.2. 
121 CO, supra note 39, at s 4 of Schedule 1. 
122 HKCC, MERGER RULE GUIDELINES (2015), ¶¶ 2.18–2.19. 
123 See also Stephen Crosswell, Tom Jenkins and Donald Pan, The Merger Control Review: Hong Kong, THE 
LAW REVIEWS ¶ ii (2021), https://thelawreviews.co.uk/title/the-merger-control-review/hong-kong (archived 
Aug. 9, 2021). 
124 Although in 2019 there were indications suggesting that the Merger Rule could be made operational for all 
sectors, this has not yet materialized. See Kanis Leung, Tightening of Hong Kong’s Competition Laws to Cover 
Mergers on the Horizon, says Competition Commission chairwoman, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Jan. 17, 
2019) https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/2182425/tightening-hong-kongs-
competition-laws-cover (archived Aug. 25, 2021). 
125 Lin and Ross, supra note 42, at 125. It has been reported that Rasul Butt, then senior executive director of the 
HKCC (and currently (since May 2021) its chief executive officer), stated during an online event in April 2021 
that ‘it’s not a matter of whether we will have merger powers. It’s a matter of when…’. See Crosswell, Jenkins 
and Pan, supra note 123, at footnote 8. 
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been eclipsed somewhat, given the disruptions caused by technological developments and in 
particular the advent of platforms offering voice and data communications services. Finally, it 
has been recognized that in some sectors,126 there exists the phenomenon of so-called “killer 
acquisitions”, characterized by established businesses acquiring promising start-ups or nascent 
competitors, with a view to delay or suppress the commercialization of new products. As far 
as Hong Kong is concerned, the authority does not have the means to assess the competition 
aspects of any of these mergers. 
 
Not so in China. Article 19 of the Platform Economy Guidelines specifically clarifies that 
mergers that do not meet the thresholds for notification can be proactively investigated by the 
SAMR and allows for the merging parties to notify mergers voluntarily when these do not meet 
the thresholds. The Q&A127 accompanying the publication of the Platform Economy 
Guidelines suggests that the authority had killer acquisitions very much in mind: “the field of 
platform economy may be more prone to this situation due to the characteristic of new business 
formats and new models, or involving start-ups, emerging platforms, etc.”128 .  
 
More generally, acquisitions by Chinese tech companies have become a concern of the 
authorities. Contrary to the situation in Hong Kong, in China, mergers that meet certain 
requirements need to be notified to the SAMR.129 Similar to European precedent (and unlike 
in Singapore), merger notification is mandatory, and the parties cannot by law complete a 
 
126 Notably, in the pharmaceutical sector. The existence of killer acquisitions in Big Tech is currently subject to 
review. See Colleen Cunningham, Florian Ederer and Song Ma, Killer Acquisitions, 129 (3) JOURNAL OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 649 (2021).  
127 Q&A, SAMR, The responsible comrade of the Office of the Anti-Monopoly Commission of the State 
Council answered reporters’ questions on the Anti-Monopoly Guidelines of the Anti-Monopoly Commission of 
the State Council on the Platform Economy (国务院反垄断委员会办公室负责同志就《国务院反垄断委员会关于平
台经济领域的反垄断指南》答记者问) (7 February 2021) 
http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/xwxcs/202102/t20210207_325971.html (archived Aug. 25, 2021). 
128 Id. at question 9. 
129 AML, supra note 21, at art. 5 and Chapter 4. 
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transaction before clearance.130 On 20 October 2020, the SAMR issued its Interim Provisions on the 
Review of Concentration of Business Operators,131 which came into force on 1 December 2020 and 
consolidated six prior regulations issued by different authorities on merger filings. These constitute the 
main guidelines but there are also a number of different Guidance Opinion issued by SAMR on 
mergers.132  
 
Similar to the way that access and ownership of data can be a factor in assessing dominance, so in 
merger control data can be a factor in assessing the competitive impact of a concentration. The ability 
to “master and process data” and to control data interfaces; whether one of the parties can control data 
interfaces, the existence of exclusive rights are all important factors.133 It is also noteworthy that the 
Platform Economy Guidelines specifically highlight that data can form part of a remedy package 
imposed to assuage concerns about the anticompetitive effects of mergers, including by imposing 
divestiture of tangible assets, including data,134 and “behavioral conditions such as opening up network, 
data or platform infrastructure”, “terminating exclusive agreements, modifying platform rules or 
algorithms, promising compatibility or not reducing interoperability”.135 
 
The focus on merger control and Big Tech in China is already evident in a number of recent news. 
 
 
130 AML, supra note 21, at art. 21. 
131 SAMR, INTERIM PROVISIONS ON THE REVIEW OF CONCENTRATION OF BUSINESS OPERATORS (《经营者集中审查暂
行规定》已于2020年10月20日经国家市场监督管理总局2020年第9次局务会议审议通过，现予公布，自2020年12月
1日起施行) (23 October 2020), http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/fgs/202010/t20201027_322664.html (archived 
Aug. 25, 2021). 
132 See Wei Yingling and Gong Minfang, Merger Control in China: overview, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL 
LAW (1 January 2021), https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/5-500-
8611?transitionType=Default&contextData=%28sc.Default%29 (archived Aug. 25, 2021). 
133 Platform Economy Guideline, supra note 48, at art 20.. 
134 Id. art. 21(1). 
135 Id. art. 21(2). 
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First, the SAMR has stepped up enforcement against parties for non-reporting mergers. Under the 
AML, the maximum sanction that can be imposed currently is RMB 500,000. In July 2021, it was 
reported that Tencent will be fined the maximum amount for failing to notify the acquisition of two 
apps, Kuwo and Kugou.136 At least ten other cases have been reported of tech companies fined the 
maximum amount for failure to notify mergers.137 
 
Second, mergers have been abandoned (for example, the proposed acquisition of a controlling stake in 
iQIYI, a video platform owned by Baidu, in which reportedly both Alibaba and Tencent were 
interested),138 with the parties citing the tightening of the rules as a reason; or have been blocked by 
the authority. The notified proposed merger between Huya Inc and Douyu International, two online 
game streaming platforms backed by Tencent that collectively control more than 80 percent of China’s 
online game streaming market,139 was blocked in July 2021. Both companies accepted the decision as 
per two identical press releases that they issued.140 
 
4. Sanctions 
Concerning sanctions, under article 46(1) AML, the authority “shall order” the undertaking to: 
(i) stop the illegal act; (ii) confiscate the illegal gains; and (iii) pay a fine up to 10 per cent of 
 
136 Pei Li, EXCLUSIVE China to order Tencent Music to give us music label exclusivity-sources, REUTERS (July 
12, 2021) https://www.reuters.com/world/china/exclusive-china-order-tencent-music-give-up-music-label-
exclusivity-sources-2021-07-12/ (archived July 19, 2021). 
137 These cases are listed in Bai and Poddar, supra note 27, at Annex 1. 
138 Julie Zhu and others, Exclusive: Alibaba, Tencent put talks to buy iQIYI stake on hold due to price, 
regulatory concerns – Sources, REUTERS (Nov. 27, 2020) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baidu-m-a-iqiyi-
exclusive-idUSKBN2870SI (archived Aug. 25, 2021). 
139 Press Release, SAMR, Announcement of the State Administration for Market Regulation on the Anti-
monopoly Review Decision on Prohibiting the Merger between Huya Company and Douyu International 
Holdings Co., Ltd. (‘市场监管总局关于禁止虎牙公司与斗鱼国际控股有限公司合并案反垄断审查决定的
公告’) (10 July 2021) http://www.samr.gov.cn/fldj/tzgg/ftjpz/202107/t20210708_332421.html (archived Aug. 
27, 2021). 
140 Press Release, DouYu, DouYu Announces Termination of Merger Agreement with Huya’ (July 12, 2021) 
https://ir.douyu.com/2021-07-12-DouYu-Announces-Termination-of-Merger-Agreement-with-Huya (archived 
July 17, 2021); Press Release, Huya, HUYA Inc. Announces Termination of Merger Agreement with DouYu 
(July 12, 2021) https://www.barrons.com/press-release/huya-inc-announces-termination-of-merger-agreement-
with-douyu-01626089862?tesla=y&tesla=y (archived July 17, 2021). 
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the turnover in the preceding year. The text of article 46 suggests that the three should be 
adopted in parallel (so that the infringers should be ordered to pay a fine and also to return the 
illegal gains they made, thereby increasing the deterrent effect of the fines). However, due to a 
combination of lack of clear guidance and administrative convenience (as it can be difficult to 
determine what constitutes an illegal gain), illegal gains were confiscated only in about 30 
percent of cases decided between January 2015 and June 2020, and a fine imposed in more 
than 60 percent of cases.141  
 
When determining a fine, the authorities must consider factors such as the nature, seriousness 
and duration of the illegal acts.142 The fine against industry associations is currently capped at 
RMB 500,000, although in serious cases the trade association can be de-registered. As seen 
above,143 the fine for non-notification of a merger is also subject to a RMB 500,000 cap. Under 
proposals to amend the AML published for consultation on 2 January 2020 (AML Amendment 
Proposals),144 the SAMR seeks to increase the penalties for breaches of the AML: against trade 
associations,145 against businesses and individuals for obstruction of investigations,146 and in 
merger control (for failure to notify and for breach of remedies).147 For the first time, the AML 
Amendment Proposals also appear to allow for the possibility of criminal liability for breaches 
 
141 Josh Yi Xue, Tian Gu, Wei Yu, Confiscating Illegal Gains in Chinese Anti-monopoly Law Enforcement 
Practice, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 21, 2020) https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=4a4c5952-625b-4d0b-
ade8-01a2d983dddc (archived Aug. 25, 2021). 
142 AML, supra note 21, at art. 49. 
143 See infra section I.A.4. 
144 Press Release, SAMR, Announcement of the State Administration for Market Regulation on the Public 
Consultation on the "Anti-Monopoly Law" Amendment Draft (Draft for Public Comment) (2 January 2020): the 
Chinese text of the proposed amendments, (《中华人民共和国反垄断法》修订草案（公开征求意见稿) ) can be 
downloaded, http://www.samr.gov.cn/hd/zjdc/202001/t20200102_310120.html (archived July 11, 2021), 
[hereinafter AML Amendment Proposals]. 
145 From the current upper limit of RMB 500,000 to an upper limit of RMB 5 million. 
146 The proposal is for fines for obstructions for individuals to increase from the current upper limit of RMB 
100,000 to RMB 1 million; and for businesses from RMB 1 million to up to 1 per cent of turnover in the last 
year (or RMB 5 million if the business did not generate revenues in the past year).  
147 From the current upper limit of RMB 500,000 to a fine of up to 10 percent of the turnover of the business 
concerned for the preceding year.  
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of competition law, by stating that criminal liability may arise where the violation constitutes 
a crime.148 Amendments to the AML may be forthcoming in 2021.149  
 
The fines imposed on the companies that breach the prohibition of anticompetitive agreements 
(including for cartels) and of abuse of dominance will not change, however, and these seem to 
be relatively low. The fine against Alibaba for its “choose one of two” abusive practice 
mentioned above is very high in absolute terms, but in percentage terms, it equates to 4 percent 
of Alibaba’s turnover in the previous year. The fines for cartels are also noticeably higher in 
absolute terms against international cartelists, but not in in percentage terms. In the 12 Japanese 
Auto Parts Cartel,150 Sumitomo received one of the highest fine for cartels in China in absolute 
terms, at RMB 290.4 million, and this equated to 6 per cent of relevant turnover. Amongst the 
case reviewed, only one company was fined 9 per cent of its relevant turnover in a cartel case 
(EUKOR Car Carriers in the Roll-on/roll-off Services Cartel (31),151 even though the company 
seems to have provided evidence).   
 
In Hong Kong, the HKCT can impose fines up to 10 per cent of the turnover of the business 
obtained in the jurisdiction for each year of infringement up to a maximum of three years; the 
payment of the costs of the HKCC’s investigation; the disqualification of directors for up to 
 
148 AML Amendment Proposals, supra note 144, at art. 57. 
149 According to the legislative work plan of the State Council of the PRC issued on 21 June 2021. See Hogan 
Lovells, Revision of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law to close “loopholes” in anti-cartel enforcement (8 July 2021) 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/revision-of-china-s-anti-monopoly-law-1594433/ (archived July 11, 2021). 
150 12 Japanese Auto Parts and Bearing Manufacturers Cartel (NDRC, 2015), see Michael Gu, NDRC imposes 
record fines on 12 Japanese auto parts and bearing manufacturers, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 25, 2014), 
https://www.lexology.com/commentary/competition-antitrust/china/anjie-law-firm/ndrc-imposes-record-fines-
on-12-japanese-auto-parts-and-bearing-manufacturers (archived Aug. 27, 2021). See also University of 
Melbourne, CHINA COMPETITION BULLETIN (July/August 2014), at 2, 
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/1796467/China-Competition-Bulletin-July-August-
2014.pdf (archived Aug. 27, 2021). 
151 Roll-on/roll-off Services Cartel (NDRC, 2015), see Michael Gu and Sihui Sun, NDRC rules in firt 
international shipping company monopoly case, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 4, 2016), 
https://www.lexology.com/commentary/competition-antitrust/china/anjie-law-firm/ndrc-rules-in-first-
international-shipping-company-monopoly-case (archived Aug. 27, 2021). 
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five years. The HKCC published a Policy on Recommended Pecuniary Penalties on 22 June 
2020,152 following the methodology indicated by the HKCT in Competition Commission v W 
Hing Construction Company & Others.153 Fines are based on a percentage of the turnover 
obtained in the jurisdiction for each year of infringement, up to a maximum of three years: if 
the contravention spanned more than three years, then the fine would be based on the three 
years when the business achieved “the highest, second highest and third highest turnover.”154 
To date, all fines imposed concerned cartels.  
 
Turnover is defined as “the total gross revenue” of a firm “obtained in Hong Kong”.155 As has 
been remarked,156 this is a relatively low level of fines, for two reasons: because there is a limit 
on the number of years considered (unlike, say, in the USA and in Canada) and because the 
turnover considered is limited to Hong Kong (unlike the case of other systems, such as the EU 
system, that takes into account the turnover on a global scale. Furthermore, as seen above, 
infringement notices cannot include fines. 
 
Turnover (like in Hong Kong) and amount of sales (like in China), or revenue, differ in 
accounting terms, as it is possible to conceive of turnover (such as inventory turnover) that 
does not produce revenue, and of revenue (such as reimbursements) which does not depend on 
turnover of goods or services.157 In the context of cartel cases, where pecuniary sanctions are 
 
152 HKCC, POLICY ON RECOMMENDED PECUNIARY PENALTIES (2020), 
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/policy_doc/files/Policy_on_Recommended_Pecuniary_Pen
alties_Eng.pdf (archived July 6, 2021). 
153 Competition Commission v W Hing Construction Company & Others [2020] HKCT 1 (Penalty Judgment). 
154 CO, supra note 39, at s 93. 
155 CO, supra note 39, at s 93(4). 
156 Lin and Ross, supra note 42, at 117–118. 
157 For a primer about the difference between revenue and turnover, see Revolut Contributor, Turnover vs 
Revenue: do they mean the same thing? (2020), https://blog.revolut.com/a/turnover-vs-revenue/ (archived July 
26, 2021). 
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related directly to the value of sales of the businesses in question, the concepts of relevant 
turnover and revenue are used interchangeably.158 
 
B. Tools for Detection and Enforcement: settlements and private actions; 
leniency and whistleblowing. 
Competition authorities have a number of tools for detection and enforcement of the 
competition rules. Comparing and contrasting the position in Hong Kong and in China, it 
appears that the tools of enforcement in Hong Kong are less wide ranging than the equivalent 
tools in China. This holds true whether the enforcement regime is considered, or the possibility 
of settlements and of private actions for breaches of the rules. As far as the tools of detection 
are concerned, Hong Kong appears to have embraced a more aggressive approach to leniency 
policies. In both jurisdictions, whistleblowing is encouraged and embraced. 
 
1. Fining the Infringers 
First, competition authorities can seek to fine the infringers. Hong Kong and China differ 
fundamentally in the requirements to be met for issuing a fine, however and consideration of 
the two jurisdictions highlights the different models available. In China, as will be explained 
below,159 the SAMR has very wide latitude to impose fines.  
 
In Hong Kong, on the contrary: (i) the HKCC must institute proceedings before the HKCT; but 
(ii) agreements and conduct “of lesser significance” are statutorily exempt from investigation. 
Specifically, agreements between parties with a combined turnover of less than HK$200 
 
158 Yannis Katsoulacos, Evgenia Motchenkova and David Ulph, Penalizing cartels—a spectrum of regimes, 
JOURNAL OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 339, 342 (2019). 
159 See infra section I.C.2. 
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million are exempt from application of the First Conduct Rule,160 although the exemption does 
not apply to instances of Serious Anti-Competitive Conduct. Firms with less than HK$40 
million of turnover per year are exempt from the Second Conduct Rule.161 This is potentially a 
serious impediment to effective enforcement: deciding not to investigate de minimis 
agreements should be a matter for the authorities’ discretion, based on factors such as the size 
and competitiveness of the market, rather than the turnover of the parties. As it has also been 
noted,162 based on figures provided during the debate on the adoption of the CO, the average 
annual turnover of small and medium enterprises in Hong Kong was HK$11 million in 2011. 
A threshold of HK$200 million would exempt agreements between up to 18 averaged sized 
small and medium enterprises in Hong Kong. Further: (iii) in the case of breaches of the First 
Conduct Rule that are not cartels or other instances of serious anticompetitive conduct, the 
HKCC must first issue a “warning notice” against the infringing parties and only if the conduct 
continues, it can then institute proceedings against the parties in the HKCT.163 As has been 
noted,164 this can be difficult to administered, as not in all cases it would be clear that a course 
of conduct meets the requirements of serious anti-competitiveness, and may reduce the 
willingness of the HKCC to enforce the First Conduct Rule is cases other than the most blatant 
instances of cartels.  
 
2. Reaching Settlements 
Second, the authorities can accept commitments from the parties under investigation. In Hong 
Kong, section 60 of the CO specifically allows for commitments to be accepted to end an 
 
160 CO, supra note 39, at Schedule 1, section 5. 
161 CO, supra note 39, at section 6. 
162 Lin and Ross, supra note 42, at footnote 40: this could reduce competition in “many consumer facing service 
industries—as long as the actions do not represent serious anti-competitive conduct.”.  
163 CO, supra note 39, at s. 82. 
164 Kelvin Hiu Fai Kwok, The New Hong Kong Competition Law: Anomalies and Challenges, WORLD 
COMPETITION 541, 562 (2014); Lin and Ross, supra note 42, at 121. 
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investigation. This procedure does not require an admission of breach of a conduct rule, 
therefore, when the commitment procedure is followed, the parties aggrieved do not have a 
follow-on right of action against the infringers.165 The procedure has been used in two cases, 
namely the Seaport Alliance case,166 where the parties offered commitments during the course 
of an investigation into the activities of the alliance, and the Online travel agents (OTAs) 
case,167 mentioned above. This is the only case investigated by the HKCC to date in the 
online/digital sector. Major online travel agents Expedia.com, Booking.com and Trip.com 
entered into so-called “parity” clauses with hotels in Hong Kong. Hotels were required to give 
terms to the OTAs that were at least the same as those they offered to any other sales channels, 
as regards room prices, conditions, and availability. The HKCC accepted commitments that 
oblige the three OTAs not to enter into parity clauses for a period of five years, and to self-
report their compliance. This is a cautious approach if compared to the approach of competition 
authorities in Europe. Already in 2015, Booking.com announced that they were amending 
parity provisions in their contracts throughout Europe, following commitments they entered 
into in France, Italy and Sweden.168 
 
Commitments can also be accepted to terminate an investigation after the HKCC issues an 
infringement notice, under section 67(2) CO. This possibility applies in cases of breaches of 
the First and the Second Conduct Rule and the HKCC has applied it in two First Conduct Rule 
cases to date. Six hotel groups and an operator of tour counters were issued with infringement 
notices in the Tourist attraction tickets case.169 The HKCC found that these acted as facilitators 
 
165 Under CO, supra note 39, at s 110, see infra section I.B.3. 
166 Case EC/03AY, commitments accepted in October 2020, 
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/enforcement/registers/commitments/commitments_reg.html (archived Aug. 19, 
2021). 
167 Case EC/02NJ, commitments accepted in May 2020, Id. 
168 See Press Release, Booking.com, Booking.com to Amend Parity Provisions Throughout Europe (June 25, 
2015) https://news.booking.com/bookingcom-to-amend-parity-provisions-throughout-europe/ (archived Aug. 
19, 2021). 
169 Case EC/0271, commitments accepted in January 2021, supra note 166. 
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in a price fixing agreement for tourist attractions and transportation tickets sold in hotels in 
Hong Kong. In this way, they facilitated a cartel between two travel service providers, Gray 
Line Tours of Hong Kong and Tink Labs Limited.170 The HKCC accepted commitments and 
terminated the investigation. In the Quantr case,171 infringement notices were issued against 
both Quantr and a software supplier, Nintex Proprietary Limited for their involvement in a bid 
rigging cartel for the provision of IT services. Quantr did not accept to enter into commitments, 
the case was brought in the HKCT, and Quantr was fined HK$37,702.26.172 Nintex did accept 
the infringement notice,173 took steps to strengthen its compliance programme and the HKCC 
terminated the investigation.  
 
In China, in the published guidelines on monopoly agreements,174 the SAMR specified that the 
parties to an investigation can offer commitments and request a suspension of an 
investigation175 for all AML violations, except for hardcore cartels (price fixing, output 
restrictions and market allocation).176 This is an important difference with the position in Hong 
Kong, where the commitment procedure is available even in case of hardcore cartels. The 
parties under an investigation can submit a settlement proposal that includes a number of 
commitments and, if this is accepted, SAMR will suspend or terminate an investigation. When 
 
170 The investigation against the cartelists is ongoing: Press Release, HKCC, Competition Commission issues 
infringement notices to six hotel groups and a tour counter operator for facilitating a price-fixing cartel (Feb. 17, 
2021) 
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/EN_PR_Infringement_Notices_Tourist_Attraction_Tickets.pdf 
(archived Aug. 27, 2021). 
171 Competition Commission v Quantr Limited and Cheung Man Kit, CTEA1/2020. 
172 Competition Commission v Quantr Limited and Cheung Man Kit [2020] HKCT 10. 
173 HKCC, Notice issued under section 67 of the Competition Ordinance (Cap. 619) regarding anti-competitive 
conduct in Ocean Park bidding exercise, addressed to: Nintex Proprietary Limited (10 January 2020) 
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/enforcement/registers/infringement_notices/files/Infringement_Notice_Eng_202
00110.pdf (archived Aug. 19, 2021).  
174 SAMR, INTERIM PROVISIONS ON PROHIBITING MONOPOLY AGREEMENTS (禁止垄断协议暂行规定) (July 1, 2019) 
http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/fgs/201907/t20190701_303056.html (archived Aug. 19, 2021). 
175 Id. This is the first time that a Chinese competition authority has issued guidelines in a published book, as 
noted by Zhaofeng Zhou, China: Settling Conduct Matters with the SAMR GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW 
(2021) https://globalcompetitionreview.com/guide/the-settlements-guide/first-edition/article/china-settling-
conduct-matters-the-samr (archived July 11, 2021). 
176 SAMR, INTERIM PROVISIONS ON PROHIBITING MONOPOLY AGREEMENTS, supra note 174, at art. 22.  
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this happens, there is no finding as to the liability of the businesses in question and therefore 
no pecuniary sanctions,177 which is an attraction of the settlement procedure. The parties that 
enter into a settlement agreement with the SAMR can still be sued in civil litigation, however.  
 
3. Private Enforcement 
Under article 50 of the AML, private enforcement actions are available in China. The Supreme 
People’s Court (SPC) issued guidance on both stand-alone and follow-on private action,.178 
And there is widespread acknowledgment that private litigation in China is on the ascent. As it 
has been noted, for example,179 the 2020 annual report of the Intellectual Property Tribunal 
heard a number of antitrust cases involving ICT, pharmaceuticals, power supply, construction 
and security products.180 An increasing number of standalone actions particularly against tech 
companies, and the development of follow-on actions, have been important developments in 
2020.181 Over the years, there has also been a gradual increase of private actions against SOEs 
and governmental agencies.182 
 
The possibility for victims of anticompetitive actions to claim damages in a standalone private 
action is not available in Hong Kong. This is a change from the position under the original 
detailed proposals of the government for a competition law, which included the possibility to 
 
177 AML, supra note 21, at art. 45. 
178 Supreme People’s Court, Rules of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Application 
of Law in Hearing Civil Cases Caused by Monopolistic Conduct  
(最高人民法院關于審理因壟斷行為引發的民事糾紛案件應用法律若幹問題的規定 [已被修訂]) 
(2012), art. 4, 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=9300&lib=law&SearchKeyword=Application%20of%2&Encodi
ngName=big5 (archived July 11, 2021). 
179 Gibson Dunn, ‘Antitrust in China—2020 Year in Review’ (4 March 2021), 7, 
https://www.gibsondunn.com/antitrust-in-china-2020-year-in-review/ (archived July 11, 2021). 
180 Id.  
181 Id. at 8–9. 
182 As reported in Baker McKenzie, Competition Litigation in China—Availability of private enforcement in 
respect of competition law infringements and jurisdiction (2016), https://www.bakermckenzie.com/-
/media/files/expertise/antitrust/global_guide_to_competition_litigationfinal.pdf?la=en (archived July 11, 2021). 
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bring standalone private actions.183 The CO provides for a right to bring a follow-on private 
action, against “a person” who “has contravened” or “is contravening”,184 “has been or is 
involved in the contravention of” a conduct rule.185 When the HKCC accepts commitments, 
aggrieved third parties cannot bring an action against the infringers.  
 
4. Leniency 
Third, when a business involved in a cartel self-reports its monopolistic conduct and submits 
significant evidence, the competition authority may, at its discretion, grant full immunity or a 
reduction in fines.  
 
In Hong Kong, the HKCC adopted leniency policies that encourage reporting of cartels 
(unusually, the CO allows for leniency to be granted for a breach of the First or the Second 
Conduct Rule,186 but to date the HKCC has only enacted policies to deal with leniency for 
cartels conduct). The HKCC issued a first leniency policy for businesses in 2015 and 
substantially revised it in 2020,187 at the same time as it adopted a leniency policy for 
individuals (such as employees or former employees of a company).188 The HKCC issued a 
first leniency policy for businesses in 2015 and substantially revised it in 2020,189 at the same 
time as it adopted a leniency policy for individuals.190 Businesses that do not qualify from the 
Leniency Policy can enter into a cooperation agreement with the HKCC under the Cooperation 
 
183 Williams, supra note 41, at 568. 
184 CO, supra note 39, at s 110(1)(a). 
185 CO, supra note 39, at s 110(1)(b). 
186 CO, supra note 39, at s 80. 
187 HKCC, LENIENCY POLICY FOR UNDERTAKINGS ENGAGED IN CARTEL CONDUCT (2020) 
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/policy_doc/files/Leniency_Policy_Undertakings_E.pdf 
(archived July 8, 2021) [hereinafter HKCC Leniency Policy for Undertakings]. 
188 HKCC, LENIENCY POLICY FOR INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED IN CARTEL CONDUCT (2020) 
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/policy_doc/files/Leniency_Policy_Individuals_E.pdf 
(archived July 8, 2021) [hereinafter HKCC Leniency Policy for Individuals]. 
189 HKCC, Leniency Policy for Undertakings, supra note 187. 
190 HKCC, Leniency Policy for Individuals, supra note 188. 
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and Settlement Policy.191 The HKCC may apply a discount of up to 50 per cent on the 
applicable fine. The Cooperation Policy also introduces a “leniency plus” regime. If a business 
has entered into a cooperation agreement in relation to a cartel, and disclose the existence of a 
second cartel, the HKCC can apply an extra discount of 10 per cent of the recommended 
pecuniary penalty in the first cartel. The leniency policy has already been successful: in the 
Quantr case for bid rigging in the procurement of IT services mentioned above,192 the issue 
was brought to the attention of the HKCC by the co-bidder as a leniency applicant. 
 
In China, the legal basis for the availability of leniency is article 46(2) AML. As in most other 
jurisdictions, leniency is only available for horizontal monopoly agreements concluded 
between competitors, under article 13–14 AML and in particular cartels. The SAMR issued its 
own Leniency Guidelines in June 2020:193 the first applicant to provide evidence of a cartel not 
yet under investigation, and the first to provide material evidence not yet in possession of 
SAMR, can be granted immunity or leniency of not less than 80 per cent.194 The second 
applicant can see the fine mitigated by 30 to 50 per cent. The third, by 20 to 30 per cent. 
Subsequent applicants can receive a discount in the pecuniary penalty of no more than 20 per 
cent.  
 
Although formal leniency policies are a relatively new tool at the disposal of the authorities in 
China, leniency in the general sense of a reduction of the fines in exchange for cooperation 
with the authorities seems to have been a feature in the enforcement of the AML from the start. 
 
191 HKCC, COOPERATION AND SETTLEMENT POLICY (2019), 
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/policy_doc/files/Cooperation_Policy_Eng.pdf (archived 
July 8, 2021). 
192 Competition Commission v Quantr Limited and Cheung Man Kit [2020] HKCT 10. 
193 SAMR, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPLICATION OF LENIENCY PROGRAM IN HORIZONTAL MONOPOLY AGREEMENT CASES  
(横向垄断协议案件宽大制度适用指南) (2020) http://gkml.samr.gov.cn/nsjg/fldj/202009/t20200918_321856.html (archived 
July 11, 2021) [hereinafter SAMR Leniency Policy. 
194 Id. at art. 13. 
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In the cases reviewed, leniency was granted in at least 19 cases, starting from one of the very 
first cases under the AML (and the Price Law), namely the Rice Noodles Cartel sanctioned by 
the Guanxi Price Bureau in March 2010.195 In the international LCD Panel Manufacturing 
Cartel case,196 decided in 2013, but under the Price Law (as the breaches preceded the entry 
into force of the AML), the NDRC’s sanctions were “relatively low” due to the participants’ 
cooperation, applying general principles in administrative law. Leniency in the formal sense of 
being recognized as a specific tool for detection197 was applied for the first time in the Sea Sand 
Cartel case198 by the Guangdong Price Bureau under guidance from the NDRC. Out of the 95 
cases identified, leniency considerations led to firms receiving total exemption from fines in 
12 cases.  
 
5. Whistleblowing 
Finally, whistleblowing is also a powerful tool for detection. Whistleblowing is a relatively 
common practice in Hong Kong. In the period from the CO coming into force to November 
2020, the HKCC received “around 4,600 enquiries and complaints, of which 60% were on the 
First Conduct Rule with cartel conduct, including price fixing, being a major concern”.199 The 
press release issued by the HKCC after the HKCT handed down its first two judgments makes 
it clear that the two cases in question were “[d]iscovered as a result of complaints from 
members of the public”.200 These findings are also in line with the results of surveys, such as 
 
195 Rice Noodles Cartel, supra note 30.  
196 LCD Panel Manufacturing Cartel, supra note 26. See also Xue and Yang, supra note 30, at ¶ 6.03.A.8. 
197 Under the terms of the AML, supra note 21, at art. 46(2). 
198 Sea Sand Cartel (Guangdong Price Bureau with NDRC guidance, September 2012), discussed in Xue Qiang 
and Yang Xixi, supra note 30 ¶ 6.03.A.7.  
199 Press Release, HKCC, Competition Commission launches “Combat Price Fixing Cartels” Campaign (Nov. 9, 
2020) 
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/EN_PR_CC_launches_Combat_Price_Fixing_Cartels_Campai
gn_20201109.pdf (archived July 8, 2021). 
200 Press Release, HKCC, Competition Commission welcomes judgments in Hong Kong’s first two competition 
cases (17 May 2019) 
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/20190517_Competition_Commission_welcomes_judgments_i
n_Hong_Kong_s_first_two_competition_cases_eng.pdf (archived Aug. 17, 2021). 
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the Freshfields 2020 whistleblowing survey: 48 per cent of respondents in Hong Kong said that 
“they had been involved in whistleblowing.”201 Possible reasons include the fact that a 
whistleblowing mechanism exists in Hong Kong in the finance sector, that the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange is very focused on corporate governance and possibly the fact that respondents 
in Hong Kong may have a slightly different understanding of the practice, similar to the 
findings in China.202 
 
In China, whistleblowing is “an age-old practice dating back to the imperial time”,203 although 
there is no official translation of the term in Chinese. The concept of jubao (literally, “accusing 
and reporting”) is a newly invented term which emerged from the more recent anticorruption 
campaigns.204 The main aim of jubao is to report the wrongdoing of public officials and 
managers in companies, and therefore this is different from the narrow Western concept of an 
employee reporting on its organization, usually after having exhausted the internal procedures. 
In China, the concept is both “broader in terms of who can blow the whistle” (any ordinary 
citizen can do so) and “slightly narrower as to whistleblowing channels” (it often consists of 
reports made to official centers and supervisory organs).205 
 
A number of provisions grant rewards to whistleblowers in China, for example to those 
reporting safety and counterfeiting issues,206 although there is no formal centralized policy to 
 
201 Nicola Jones and Stephanie Chiu, Whistleblowing in the spotlight: why are managers in Hong Kong more 
likely to blow the Whistle? LEXOLOGY (2020) https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=293001aa-ab47-
447d-b1d7-204fb1172a99 (archived July 12, 2021). 
202 Id.  
203 Gong, supra note 46, at 1900. 
204 Id. at 1902. 
205 Id. at 1903. 
206 For example, a whistle-blower who reports on product quality or food and drug safety may receive a reward 
of up to RMB500,000 from the regulatory agency. See Fan Li and Stephanie Chiu, Whistleblowing in the 
spotlight—what is happening in mainland China? FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER (2020) 
https://riskandcompliance.freshfields.com/post/102gjm1/whistleblowing-in-the-spotlight-what-is-happening-in-
mainland-china accessed 12 July 2021. 
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deal with whistleblowing in antitrust matters.207 In September 2019, the State Council issued 
“Guiding Opinions on Strengthening and Standardizing In-process and Ex-post Regulation”208 
(Whistleblowing Guiding Opinions). This required provincial governments and the various 
ministries and agencies under the State Council to establish reward systems for whistle-
blowers. In November 2019, the SAMR issued draft provisions purporting to grant financial 
rewards for whistleblowers that report serious violation of law,209 including violations of 
competition law.210 These provisions remain in draft. If they were adopted, whistleblowers 
under this reward scheme would receive substantially more than what is currently available 
under other financial reward provisions: they could receive as much as 5 per cent of the fine 
paid,211 up to a maximum of RMB 1 million, or, for reporting violations of “systemic and 
regional risks” or that “have or may cause major social harm”, up to RMB 2 million.212 
 
For a number of reasons ranging from these legislative developments to social media influence, 
it appears that in China, like in Hong Kong, individuals are increasingly blowing the whistle.213  
One of the very first cartels uncovered, the Concrete Industry - Jiangsu Cartel (5), in January 
2011 was investigated following complaints by whistleblowers, unhappy about the cartel set 
up by the Committee for Concrete of Lianyungang City Construction Material and Machinery 
 
207 and because individuals in China are not liable for breaches of the competition law, there is no equivalent to 
the Hong Kong Leniency Policy for Individuals. 
208 Fan Li and Stephanie Chiu, ‘Whistleblowing in the spotlight—what is happening in mainland China?’ (2020) 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer https://riskandcompliance.freshfields.com/post/102gjm1/whistleblowing-in-
the-spotlight-what-is-happening-in-mainland-china (archived July 12, 2021). 
209 SAMR, Announcement of the State Administration for Market Regulation on Public Consultation on the 
"Interim Measures for Reporting and Rewarding Major Illegal Acts in the Field of Market Supervision (Revised 
Draft for Comment)" (国家市场监督管理总局关于《市场监管领域重大违法行为举报奖励暂行办法（修订
征求意见稿）》公开征求意见的公告) (19 November 2019) 
http://www.samr.gov.cn/hd/zjdc/201911/t20191119_308625.html (archived July 27, 2021). [hereinafter Draft 
Whistleblowing Guidelines]. 
210 Id. at art. 4. 
211 Id. at art. 12. 
212 Id. at art. 13. 
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Association. Also in 2011, in the Package Industry Cartel (7) a whistleblower complained 
about a cartel coordinated by the industry association. In 2012, an investigation of the Wuxi 
Quarry Operators Cartel,214 (17) started based on information received from the Wuxi County 
Public Security Bureau. A “public complaint” filed in July 2013 triggered the investigation of 
the Mayang Shale Brick Cartel.215 In the later Haier RPM case, 216 the investigation began in 
response to multiple reports made through the NDRC’s 12358 price supervision platform in 
June 2015. As seen above,217 local e-commerce companies have been reporting cartels in the 
courier industry (e.g. Ningxia Courier Companies Cartel).218 In the Xiamen Courier Industry 
Price Self-Discipline Convention Cartel,219 e-commerce companies were said to have driven 
down the profits of the courier companies, leading to the cartel. It is possible that the e-
commerce companies complained.  
C. The Institutional Setup 
The two jurisdictions perhaps differ the most in the institutional set-up.  
 
1. The Adversarial System of Hong Kong 
It has been said that the competition law regime in Hong Kong is a “curious Frankenstein 
regime”:220 whilst the prohibitions are substantially based on the EU and Singapore models, 
procedurally Hong Kong has adopted an adversarial regime. An adversarial process is 
characterized by an impartial decision-maker (often a judge) with a relatively passive role. The 
 
214 Wuxi Quarry Operators Cartel (Chongqig AIC, 2014), University of Melbourne, CHINA COMPETITION 
BULLETIN (January/February 2015), at 4, 
https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/1796424/China-Competition-Bulletin-Jan-Feb-2015.pdf 
(archived Aug. 27, 2021). 
215 Supra note 73. 
216 Haier RPM case (Shanghai Price Bureau, August 2016), University of Melbourne, CHINA COMPETITION 
BULLETIN (July/August 2016), at 3, https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/2105238/China-
Competition-Bulletin-July-August-2016.pdf (archived Aug. 27, 2021). 
217 Supra note 93. 
218 Supra note 95. 
219 Supra note 30. 
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judge is not involved in gathering evidence or identifying the issues. The parties “bear primary 
responsibility for determining the sequence and manner in which evidence is presented and 
legal issues are argued”.221 Generally speaking, common law jurisdictions tend to adopt the 
adversarial system of enforcement, which applies, for example, in the US; Australia; and 
Canada (but not in the UK).  
 
Within this system, the HKCC has a number of competition policy functions,222 including an 
investigative and prosecutorial role. It is an independent statutory body in corporate form223 
with a management board of members that oversees an executive arm. The members are 
appointed by the Chief Executive and can be removed only in specified circumstances.224 The 
HKCC’s executive arm is not part of the civil service,225 further guaranteeing a measure of 
independence. The HKCC also has an advisory role. Although it generally encourages 
businesses to carry out a self-assessment of the legality of their agreements under the 
competition rules, businesses can also ask for guidance.226  
 
Considering that it only begun recruiting staff in May 2013, the HKCC has been very active 
and this has been possible due to substantial government funding.227 In its latest annual report 
(2019/20),228 the HKCC reported government subvention of approximately HK$124.3 million 
(approximately US$ 16 million) and 61 staff members “as at March 2020.”229 These figures 
 
221 Laverne Jacobs et al., The Nature of Inquisitorial Processes in Administrative Regimes, 24 CANADIAN 
JOURNAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE 261, 262–263 (2011). 
222 CO, supra note 39, at section 130. 
223 CO, supra note 39, at section 129. 
224 CO, supra note 39, at schedule 5, section 5. 
225 CO, supra note 39, at section 132: ‘The Commission is not servant or agent of Government’. 
226 CO, supra note 39, at section 9. 
227 Lin and Ross, supra note 42, at 129. 
228 HKCC, ANNUAL REPORT 2019/2020 (2020) Income and Expenditure Account, 58 
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/reports_publications/files/2019_20_CC_Annual_Report.pdf (archived 
Aug. 19, 2021). 
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show an increase from the previous year (when the HKCC reported government funding of 
approximately HK$105.3 million and 57 staff members). It has been noted that these levels of 
funding and staff are broadly in line with those of the Singapore competition authority (before 
the latter also acquired consumer protection functions).230 Interestingly, as more particularly 
detailed below, the SAMR in China reportedly only has 40 members of staff dealing with 
antitrust matters at the central level. 
 
The HKCT has adjudicative functions. Although its name, Hong Kong Competition Tribunal, 
suggests competition law expertise, it is in fact a specialist division of the Court of First 
Instance, entirely comprised of judges.231 Its judgments can be appealed to the Court of Appeal 
and then the Court of Final Appeal. It also has powers to determine follow-on actions that may 
be brought following a finding of breach by the HKCC.  
 
In the cases that have been decided, the HKCC has been remarkably successful in securing 
liability and penalty judgments. A question mark hovers over the continued ability of the 
HKCC to impose sanctions with a deterrent effect, however, due to the judiciary interpretation 
of the burden of proof that it must meet. Following the Nutanix judgment of the HKCT,232 in 
the absence of any provision dealing with standard of proof in the CO, the standard of proof 
that the HKCC must meet in proceedings for pecuniary penalties is the criminal standard of 




230 Lin and Ross, supra note 42, at 130. 
231 CO, supra note 39, at s 135(1). Under the terms of CO, supra note 39, at s 141, the HKCT can appoint 
“specially qualified assessors” to assist with its determinations. 
232 Competition Commission v Nutanix Hong Kong Ltd [2019] HKCT 2 (Nutanix) (Liability Judgment). This 
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This raises a question about the workability of the standard in competition law cases where 
complex assessments of economic data and often conflicting expert evidence are required. As 
the judgments handed down to date in Hong Kong related to Serious Anti-competitive Conduct, 
one may question whether the focus of the HKCC on hard-core cartels may also be partly 
dictated by the need to ensure that they can meet the required burden of proof before the HKCT.  
 
As competition law enforcement becomes more widespread and the parties to cartels become 
more circumspect, it is to be expected that even direct evidence of price-fixing may not be 
forthcoming: the HKCC may have only circumstantial proof of the existence of the cartel. 
Further, as has been remarked,233 the severity of the penalty should also be a factor. The 
criminal standard of proof may be warranted for individuals facing “truly criminal sanctions 
for offences that are per se in nature”234 or, for businesses, for “a very high level of financial 
penalty that can be said to constitute the functional equivalent of imprisonment of a human 
being”,235 possibly rendering the company insolvent or “at least unprofitable for some 
significant period of time”.236 This is very far from the case here, given that the penalty that 
can be imposed cannot exceed the statutory maximum of 10 per cent of the turnover in Hong 
Kong for a maximum of three years.237 As has been remarked, this leaves Hong Kong in an 
awkward position, “an odd middle ground” on hard-core cartels, “without the deterrent power 
 
 
233 Kelvin Hiu Fai Kwok, The Standard of Proof in Civil Competition Law Proceedings, 132 LAW QUARTERLY 
REVIEW 541 (2016). In this article, the author contrasts the position with the UK application of the civil standard 
of proof.  
234 Lin and Ross, supra note 42, at 132–133. 
235 Kwok, supra note 233, at 546. 
236 Id. 
237 On 18 June 2021, the Court of Appeal issued its Reasons for Judgment in an appeal against the Liability 
Judgment in the Decoration Contractors case. The HKCC had asked the Court for reconsideration of the issue of 
the standard of proof in proceedings for pecuniary penalties. The Court however “did not wish to consider this 
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of true criminal law (…) that has so helped encourage use of leniency programs, but with a 
legal process that gives respondents the protections of criminal law approach.”238  
 
2. The Administrative System of China 
China has adopted a system of administrative enforcement,239 and the enforcement record of 
the AML by the agencies in China is impressive, particularly as these have traditionally been 
“extremely understaffed”.240 It has been recently reported that the SAMR “plans to expand its 
antitrust workforce by around 20 to 30 staff, up from about 40 now”241: although the SAMR as 
a central authority can call on enforcers at the local and regional level, it is striking that it 
currently has centrally 21 fewer enforcer than the 61 members of staff reported in Hong Kong. 
 
Administrative enforcement is characterized by agency discretion in the application of the 
rules, with the decision maker playing an “active role in identifying issues, gathering evidence 
and controlling the proceedings.”242 Overall, administrative systems of enforcement are 
adopted in the majority of jurisdictions that have enacted a competition law, including the EU 




238 Lin and Ross, supra note 42, at footnote 85. 
239 Administrative systems are often called ‘inquisitorial’, in opposition to ‘adversarial’. Due to unfortunate 
historical associations between the term ‘inquisitorial’ and lack of due process, in this paper reference is made to 
‘administrative’ systems and ‘adversarial’ systems. 
240 Across the three agencies, there were fewer than 100 officials in charge of antitrust enforcement at the central 
level, many of whom were also in charge of other matters. See ZHANG, CHINESE ANTITRUST EXCEPTIONALISM, 
supra note 24, at 24–25.  
241 Reuters, EXCLUSIVE China’s antitrust regulator bulking up as crackdown on behemoths widens (Apr. 11, 
2021) https://www.reuters.com/world/china/exclusive-chinas-antitrust-regulator-bulking-up-crackdown-
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To date, it has been a relatively uncontroversial proposition in (Western) antitrust that in order 
to minimise the risks of prosecutorial bias and undue curial deference, administrative systems 
of enforcement of competition law require that the discretion of the competition agencies be 
subject to strict procedural safeguards, and to judicial scrutiny. This consensus may be eroding 
somewhat, in the light of policymakers’ and agencies’ actions and statements, as seen above.243  
 
As Angela Zhang has extensively documented and analyzed,244 however, the case of China 
sheds light on a number of consequences that follow when wide agency discretion in enforcing 
the rules meets with limited judicial scrutiny. What Zhang calls “China’s great reversal in 
regulating the platform economy”245 provides a good focal point to consider policy control 
mechanisms more generally. Specifically on antitrust, five points will be highlighted here, to 
show that indeed the institutional set up and the form of intervention in China are such that 
speed and method of enforcement guarantee impressive results (which is an advantage), at the 
expenses of scrutiny, “agency accountability, legal consistency and due process”246 (the 
disadvantages).  
 
First, far from being independent of government, the agencies that enforce the AML are part 
of the bureaucracy. Although difficult to achieve in practice, the independence of regulatory 
and competition law agencies is an aspiration in countries with established competition and 
regulatory regimes.247 In the EU, independence of public bodies is frequently required in the 
 
243 See supra, Introduction. 
244 See, in particular, Zhang, Taming the Chinese Leviathan, supra note 36; ZHANG, CHINESE ANTITRUST 
EXCEPTIONALISM, supra note 24; and Zhang, Agility over Stability, supra note 18. 
245 Zhang, Agility over Stability, supra note 244, at 1. 
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EU Treaties and in secondary law.248 Although “independence” is not specifically defined, the 
term generally refers to a situation where a public body “can act completely freely, without 
taking any instructions or being put under any pressure.”249 As seen above, in Hong Kong the 
institutional setup of the HKCC guarantees a measure of independence. In the US, although 
the US federal government retains some control over the agencies (which “remain susceptible 
to shifting policy winds in Washington”250), the clear delineation of authority between federal, 
state and country government; the scrutiny by the press; and the strict judicial oversight all give 
agencies a relatively high level of independence from the executive, compared to China.251 
 
In China, the SAMR, like its predecessor enforcers, is a Ministry level agency with multiple 
duties (including enforcement of the competition rules), which sits directly under the State 
Council of China.252 Within this overarching bureaucracy, the leadership in Beijing “enjoys the 
highest authority and wields tremendous power.”253 And because the agencies derive their 
legitimacy from the delegation of power by the top leadership and the center, “the whole 
bureaucracy is organized based on an upward accountability system.”254 
 
This structure highlights the second point made, namely that inter-agency and inter-ministry 
cooperation is essential in China for antitrust enforcement. Decisions are reached by consensus, 
with the agency in charge of an investigation requesting the input of other organisations. The 
practice is known as “huiquian” (“countersign”):255 if the different Ministries and agencies 
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agree with a proposed course of action, the State Council will ratify it. If not, the State Council 
will have to decide, after extensive research and more consultation with different Ministries. 
Inevitably, decisions are influenced by different views, and this makes them appear on occasion 
inconsistent with economic principles and international standards, after a deliberation process 
which is “rather opaque”, as the agencies do not discuss the information received through 
huiquian, not even with the parties under investigation.256 
In this highly intertwined set-up, trade associations and chambers of commerce are themselves 
often “converted from government ministries” (in a system historically based on a planned 
economy): they can and do play a key role in facilitating agreements between firms, and 
cartels.257  
Moreover, rules other than antitrust, such as anti-corruption, or food safety are enforced by 
interconnected agencies: a conflict with any one of them can aggravate the position of a 
company with the others. The interdependence between agencies makes companies operating 
in China “particularly susceptible to an array of regulatory attacks.”258  
 
This is highlighted in the recent backlash against Big Tech in China: antitrust is but one aspect 
of the regulatory action that Big Tech now face. Financial authorities have taken the lead 
against Ant Financial. After the IPO was halted on 3 November 2020, Ant was summoned to 
a meeting by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the Insurance and Banking Regulatory 
Commission, the China Securities and Exchange Commission and the Foreign Exchange 
Commission.259 In January 2021 the PBOC made public its draft regulations on non-banking 
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payment institutions (such as Ant Group; Alipay; Tencent; WeChat Pay):260 if finalized, the 
PBOC will have power to send alerts to SAMR when a non-banking payment institution 
reaches certain market shares (lower than the shares for dominance under the AML). 
Authorities such as the Ministry of Transport, the Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) 
and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology have intervened against ride-hailing 
apps, ordering them to treat drivers more fairly.261 Data security is at the root of the troubles 
experienced by Didi after their listing in New York. The CAC intervened, to carry out a 
“Cybersecurity review”,262 ordering it not to sign up new users and also taking the app off the 
app stores. 
 
Third, judicial scrutiny tends to be weak in China: by way of example, in the cases on 
anticompetitive agreements identified, only three appeals were launched by the companies, all 
of them against local branches of the agencies and they were all unsuccessful.263 The most 
interesting case concerned an appeal by Yutai, a fish feed company fined by the Hainan DRC 
 
260 Chinese Government, ‘中国人民银行关于《非银行支付机构条例（征求意见稿）》公开征求意见的通知’ (Jan. 21, 2021) 
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for RPM.264 The company challenged the decision and won in the first instance at the Haikou 
Intermediate People’s Court in 2017. Further to this, “NDRC officials travelled to Hainan to 
lobby the local government”,265 and the Hainan High Court on appeal reversed the judgment. 
Yutai appealed to the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) and lost. Whilst the SPC acknowledged 
that RPM could have procompetitive effects, it found that per se illegality of RPM was justified 
“on the grounds that the Chinese market was not yet fully developed, and competition continues 
to be weak.”266 According to the SPC “requiring the administrative agency to satisfy a high 
burden of proof could have a chilling effect on public enforcement.”267 This contrasts sharply 
with the case law in Hong Kong.  
 
The fourth point concerns the nature of the companies investigated. The Chinese Big Tech 
sector is dominated by private companies but much of Chinese traditional economy relies on 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). These are themselves part of the bureaucracy, with a rank 
determined by their governance. The 2011 antitrust investigation of China Telecoms and China 
Unicom, two powerful SOEs owned by the central government, provides an illustration of the 
stringent bureaucratic constraints that apply.268 In the Chinese bureaucracy, the rank of the 
leaders of China Unicom and China Telecom was equal to that of the leader of the agency that 
investigated them (the NDRC), outstripping that of the Director General of the Antitrust Bureau 
within the NDRC, which was responsible for antitrust matters. Central SOEs are also overseen 
by the powerful State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), 
whose goal is to maximize the value of the assets it oversees: antitrust penalties impact share 
 
264 ZHANG, CHINESE ANTITRUST EXCEPTIONALISM, supra note 24, at 77–78. 
265 ZHANG, CHINESE ANTITRUST EXCEPTIONALISM, supra note 24, at 78, quoting an interview in November 
2018, with a judge who was privy to the case. 
266 ZHANG, CHINESE ANTITRUST EXCEPTIONALISM, supra note 24, at 78. See also Lester Ross and Tingting Liu, 
China’s Supreme People’s Court Rules RPM is illegal Per Se, WILMERHALE CLIENT ALERTS (2019) 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20190703-chinas-supreme-peoples-court-rules-rpm-is-
illegal-per-se (archived July 11, 2021). 
267 ZHANG, CHINESE ANTITRUST EXCEPTIONALISM, supra note 24, at 78. 
268 ZHANG, CHINESE ANTITRUST EXCEPTIONALISM, supra note 24, at 53–56. 
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performance and asset value. Ultimately the investigation resulted in a commitment on the part 
of the SOEs to reduce fees but not a fine; the investigation was effectively suspended. 
 
Finally, procedural safeguards appear to be less developed in China than in other jurisdictions, 
(including Hong Kong, which has developed strict due process procedures). As seen above,269 
until recently direct case reporting by the agencies has been hap hazardous, obliging 
researchers to rely on second-hand accounts. Even high-profile decisions of the SAMR, such 
as the Alibaba decision, are short on details and analysis. Further, although guidance is issued 
by the authorities, it is not always followed in practice. For example, it seems that, despite the 
authorities” guidance that only one applicant should receive total immunity under the Leniency 
Policy, in fact immunity can be granted to more than one party.270  
 
III: Conclusions 
The above review of the antitrust laws of China and Hong Kong shows the pressure points in 
two jurisdictions which have adopted a competition law relatively recently, choosing different 
enforcement systems and institutional set ups.  
 
The adversarial system of Hong Kong operates within the constraints of a law that is less wide 
ranging than other modern antitrust laws, in terms of its coverage (particularly of merger 
control), enforcement (specifically, the need to issue warning notices and the mandatory 
statutory exemptions for de minimis agreements); and punishment of violations (with generally 
low sanctions and a high burden of proof for the HKCC to discharge). The administrative 
system of China operates outside the constraints of robust judicial scrutiny, highlighting the 
 
269 See supra note 62. 
270 See supra note 80. 
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risk of prosecutorial bias that is inherent in any administrative system. If and when the AML 
Amendment Proposals271 will become law, this aspect will be further exacerbated, as the 
SAMR will get powers to impose higher sanctions for specific breaches, and to enforce a 
separate prohibition on organizing or assisting others to enter into anticompetitive 
agreements:272 the AML Amendment Proposals even appear to allow for the possibility of 
criminal liability for breaches of competition law, by stating that criminal liability may arise 
where the violation constitutes a crime.273 
 
There is limited evidence as to the relative merits of an adversarial system as opposed to an 
administrative system of enforcement. Based on simplified economic models, adversarial 
methods of enforcement have been found to be effective against decision-maker bias, whilst 
administrative systems arguably have a better mechanism for uncovering hidden 
information.274 Further, administrative systems are said to compound the issue of prosecutorial 
bias with undue deference by the courts,275 particularly when undertaking “complex economic 
assessments”.276 On the other hand, adversarial systems can be “often more expensive and 
protracted”277 than administrative ones. Especially in jurisdictions with a recent history of 
application of competition law, judges often lack the expertise and resources required to assess 
complex economic evidence.278 Although expertise is acquired over time, to date, the Hong 
Kong case law mentioned above seems to validate this point.  
 
271 AML Amendment Proposals, supra note 144. 
272 Id. at Chapter II, Monopoly Agreements. 
273 Id. at art. 57. For criminal liability to be introduced, there would be a need to be an amendment to the 
criminal code of China. 
274 Soojin Nam, An International Due Process Standard for Competition Adjudication? A Critical Approach 15 
ASIAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW 310, 327 (2020). 
275 COLOMO, supra note 81, at 10. 
276 Id. at footnote 91. 
277 Nam, supra note 274, at 328. 
278 See for example OECD, JUDICIAL PERSPECTIVE ON COMPETITION LAW—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Global 
Forum on Competition, 7–8 December 2017), https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP/GF(2017)4/en/pdf 
(archived July 4, 2021). 




A comparative review of the competition laws in China and in Hong Kong serves to 
demonstrate that whatever the method of enforcement and the institutional set up, adversarial 
systems still need to provide the competition authorities with the tools they need for 
enforcement and detection; and administrative systems need the corrective power of judicial 
scrutiny and procedural limits to the discretion of the authorities. The HKCC is seeking to 
strike the right balance between carrying out investigations and prosecuting businesses and 
individuals for cartel activity, on the one hand, and encouraging compliance, cooperation and 
applications for leniency, on the other hand. The two aspects go together: unless businesses 
and individuals understand that there are significant penalties for non-compliance, they will be 
unlikely to come forward and to cooperate.  
To paraphrase Zhang,279 in the current debate on how to tackle market concentration in digital 
markets, the case of China reminds us of the value of stability, alongside the need to inject in 
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